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Agricultural development is an essential factor in the economic development of much of the 
developing world and comprises a significant element of foreign assistance portfolios. Over the 
last decade, there has seen a renewed interest in more credible estimates of the economic impacts 
of development programs, such as assistance to extension programs. We compare the estimation 
of technical efficiency to farm output and income as an outcome variable to evaluate the impact of 
development programs such as farm education and extension programs. We develop a simple 
theoretical model which shows that using technical efficiency as an outcome variable could be a 
viable alternative to more traditionally used outcome variables such as farm output and farm profit. 
We note that when farmers are capital constrained, extension programs can theoretically have a 
large efficiency effect despite a small or zero change in farm profits.  
If farm technical efficiency is used as an outcome variable, then it must be estimated correctly. 
Mismeasurement of farm technical efficiency leads to misleading extension program evaluations. 
Farm households face heterogeneous infrastructural constraints (Suri 2011; Ojiem et al. 2006), 
credit constraints, information barriers and other input market constraints (Duflo, Kremer and 
Robinson 2011; Jack 201; Suri 2011and Stifel and Minten 2008), labor markets constraints 
(Henning and Henningsen 2007), socio-economical (Ojiem et al. 2006) and non-farm income 
opportunities (Chang et al. 2012) and thus have different access to agricultural inputs and outputs. 
These constraints have a substantial impact on agricultural production decisions of farm 
households. A key production decision of farm households is the allocation of resource to cash 
and food crops. Production of cash crops requires relatively higher market involvement in both the 
purchase of inputs and the selling of output than home-consumed food crops.  The heterogeneous 
constraints across farm households leads to a substantial imbalance in the transaction costs 
 
 
associated with the production of each crop. Moreover, home-consumed crops may have quality 
attributes (e.g. color, taste, softness of dough, and suitability for certain dishes) not reflected in 
market prices. Factors such as transaction costs, crop quality attributes, and other factors such as 
household characteristics are farmer specific and drive a heterogeneous price wedge between the 
market prices for household’s crop production and the economic value of these crops for the 
household. These distinctions have important implication for farm productivity analysis, such as 
technical efficiency measurement.  
The standard approach to productivity analysis, such as efficiency estimation, assume that farm 
households face homogenous price wedges that leads to homogenous set of production and profit 
functions.  However, the price gap created by transaction costs, crop quality attributes, and other 
factors such as household characteristics generally vary among subsistence, semi-subsistence and 
commercial farmers and leads to a heterogeneous set of profit and production frontiers. 
Subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers who produce largely home consumed crops have 
potentially greater price wedges than commercial farmers. Failing to account for the heterogeneity 
in price wedges that drive heterogeneity profit and production frontiers is likely to lead to 
underestimation of the efficiency of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers. We test if 
traditional productivity analysis indeed underestimates the efficiency of subsistence and semi-
subsistence farmers by employing a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model for 
household survey data in Uganda. Results confirm that naïve estimates of efficiency understate the 
efficiency scores of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers.  The results cast doubt on policies, 
such as extension programs or other information treatments, that interpret low efficiency scores 
for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as a management shortfall. 
 
 
We demonstrate the use of farm technical efficiency as an outcome measure by analyzing data 
from 2008-2012 for farm training program in Armenia. In this program, farmers received technical 
guidance on modern farm techniques.  Two previous evaluations (Schwab and Shanoyan 2016; 
Fortson et al. 2012) find ambiguous evidence that farm profits increased. The measurement or 
potential gain from an extension program is captured using farm technical efficiency measures. 
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Chapter 1. Overall Introduction 
1.1. Motivation  
Agricultural development is the cornerstone of economic development for much of the developing 
world. As a result, agricultural development programs comprise a significant element of most 
foreign assistance portfolios. The last decade has seen a renewed interest in more credible 
estimates of the economic impacts of these agricultural development programs. Development 
funds for agriculture are frequently funneled to farm education and extension programs. For 
example, about 70 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture budget in Kenya (Muyanga and Jane 
2006), 4 million dollars in Ethiopia (only under Agricultural Transformation Agency in the year 
2009), 24.4 million US dollars of the government budget in Uganda (Kuteesa et al. 2018), and 60 
million dollars in India (in the year 2010) are used to fund farm education and extension programs.  
These extensions based programs seek to provide farmers with the most up-to-date information on 
new farm techniques and technologies, with the goal of alleviating information constraints to 
profitable technology adoption (Jack 2011).  
Birner et al. (2006) defines agricultural extension programs as complete sets of organizations that 
include: governmental, non-governmental, and producer organizations that assist farmers in 
obtaining information, skills, and technologies that increase agricultural production and improve 
income and well-being of farm households. Equipping farmers with new techniques and 
technologies can increase farm productivity (including farm technical efficiency), which in turn 
can increase income and well-being. Due to an increasingly limited availability of land, and 
continual increases in world population (9.7 billion by 2050, a 2.7 billion higher than today’s 
population; United Nation 2015 report) increasing agricultural production and productivity 
through increases in efficiency and/or innovation is crucial to alleviate future food security issues. 
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In addition, gains in farm productivity increase the competitiveness of farmers, which ultimately 
increases market share domestically and at the world stage, as well as help to convince state and 
federal governments to allocate funds for development programs. Assessing information-based 
development programs, such as extension program using farm efficiency as an outcome variable 
is important. The use of farm efficiency and/or innovation directly as an outcome variable for 
evaluating extension programs has been relatively limited in previous studies. Several studies that 
assess the impact of extension program use changes in farmers’ income, yield or input use as an 
outcome variable in their evaluation (Cole and Fernando 2014; Wordofa and Sassi 2014; Davis et 
al. 2012; Fortson et al. 2012). Previous studies that strictly use farm income or yield as an outcome 
variable seem to forget that depending on the level of input use, extension programs may show 
different effects.  
The theory of most extension programs is that they will affect farmer’s knowledge, which then 
translates into a more efficient allocation of inputs (technical efficiency). Technical efficiency is 
the ability of the production firm to avoid waste through producing maximum output for a given 
technology or producing an output level using the minimum amount of input required (Farrell 
1957). Increases in technical efficiency thereby can often increase output or yields, which can 
result in increases in farm income. For the single output case, technical efficiency is defined as 
average output produced per unit of input, or referred to as average productivity (APP) (Battese 
and Coelli 1988).    
There are three stages of the production process (stage 1 to 3), assuming that some factors of 
production remain fixed, while other inputs vary. Stage 1 represents the beginning of production 
up to the point where average productivity (APP) reaches its maximum or is equal to Marginal 
Physical Production (MPP). MPP is the change in total output per unit of input. Stage 2, ranges 
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from the end of stage 1 to the point where MPP becomes zero or Total Physical Product (TPP), or 
total output, reaches its maximum. Stage 3 of production is when TPP falls as more input is added 
to the process or MPP becomes negative. Average productivity (APP) is a measure of technical 
efficiency and increases throughout stage 1 and decreases throughout stages 2 and 3. Output and 
profits of a farmer increase with the increase in technical efficiency, keeping input and output 
prices constant. However, in stage 1, of the production process, per unit changes in technical 
efficiency exceed the change in profit as input use changes. Profit, which is the difference between 
total revenue and total cost is lower in magnitude than the change in technical efficiency. 
The simple theoretical proof of this is presented in chapter two of this dissertation. Under these 
conditions, using technical efficiency, which potentially may change in a larger way, as an 
outcome variable can better capture the treatment effects of extension programs than profit. In this 
sense, technical efficiency is a more sensitive measure of program effects and increases the 
likelihood of detecting a true program impact that may otherwise may go undetected. Duflo, 
Kremer and Robinson (2011); Jack (2011) and Stifel and Minten (2008) note that farmers in 
developing countries are often faced with several constraints to agricultural production.  Credit 
constraints and input market imperfections, in particular, may prevent farmers from using optimal 
levels of inputs.  Crucially, these constraints suggest underutilization of inputs, which suggests 
that farmers may choose ‘irrational’ input levels for reasons other than information constraints. 
Hence, depending on the stage of the production, technical efficiency may be more viable option 




1.2. Purpose and Objectives 
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to identify the most appropriate methods for 
evaluation of agricultural development and extension programs in developing countries. 
More specifically, this study evaluates the impact of agricultural extension programs on farm 
productivity and development, but it can also easily be extended and used on impact analyses of 
other related agricultural development programs. This purpose is achieved by meeting the 
following objectives: 
1. Develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of extension programs that explicitly 
identifies the conditions under which farm technical efficiency is complementary to using 
farm income as an outcome measure; 
2. Develop a measure for farm technical efficiency for inseparable production and 
consumption decisions of farm households; and  
3. Demonstrate the use of farm technical efficiency or farm productivity as an outcome 
measure to evaluate extension program. 
1.3. Approach 
Using a simple theoretical model, we show that that relative desirability of using output, farm 
profit/income or technical efficiency as a metric to evaluate extension programs depends on the 
level of input use by the farm.  In particular, we note that when farmers produce at input levels 
whereby marginal physical product (MPP) exceeds average physical product (APP), known as 
Stage 1 of production, an increase in productive efficiency may not produce a commensurately 
large change in profit as compared to farm technical efficiency on relative basis.  While this stage 
of production is often ignored, as rational producers would not ‘choose’ to produce in this region, 
the population targeted by extension programs are often beset by binding constraints, such as 
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credit, that can prevent farmers from taking advantage of increasing returns to investment (Jack 
2011) and constraining them to operate in the 1st stage of production. Thus, an extension program 
targeting farmers that shows no or little impact on profit may still have resulted in more efficient 
production behavior.  As a result, in the case of a null effect of profit or income, using an outcome 
measure for efficiency can allow program evaluators to determine if the extension program 
provided no positive production effects or if farmer efficiency improved but was beset by other 
binding constraints.  
To use farm technical efficiency as an outcome variable, it must be estimated correctly. If we do 
not measure it correctly, then using farm technical efficiency as an outcome variable will lead to 
misleading extension program evaluations. Farm households face heterogeneous infrastructural 
constraints (Suri 2011; Ojiem et al. 2006), credit constraints, information barriers and other input 
market constraints (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011; Jack 201; Suri 2011and Stifel and Minten 
2008), labor markets constraints (Henning and Henningsen 2007), socio-economical (Ojiem et al. 
2006) and non-farm income opportunities (Chang et al. 2012) which leads to different access to 
agricultural inputs and outputs choices. This affects the farm household’s agricultural production 
decisions. 
Generally, production decisions of farm households are broadly classified in to cash and food 
crops. Production of cash crops requires relatively higher market involvement in both the purchase 
of inputs and the selling of output than home-consumed food crops (Henning and Henningsen 
2007; Masanjala 2006; Key et al 2000; Jayne 1994).  The heterogeneous constraints across farm 
households leads to a substantial imbalance in the transaction costs associated with the production 
of each crop. Moreover, home-consumed crops may have quality attributes (e.g. color, taste, 
softness of dough, and suitability for certain dishes) not reflected in market prices (Arslan 2011; 
6 
 
Arslan and Taylor 2009). Transaction costs, crop quality attributes, and other factors, such as 
household characteristics, are farmer specific and drive a heterogeneous price wedge between the 
market prices for a household’s crop production and the economic value of these crops for the 
household. These distinctions have important implication for farm productivity analysis, such as 
efficiency measurement.  
The standard approach to measure productivity analysis, such as efficiency, assumes that farm 
households face homogenous price wedges that leads to homogenous sets of production and profit 
frontiers.  However, the price gap created by transaction costs, crop quality attributes, and other 
factors such as household characteristics generally varies and differs between subsistence, semi-
subsistence and commercial farmers and leads to a heterogeneous set of profit and production 
frontiers. Subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers who produce largely home consumed crops 
have potentially greater price wedges than commercial farmers. Failing to account for the 
heterogeneity in price wedges that drive heterogeneous profit and production frontiers is likely to 
lead to underestimation of the efficiency for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers. We test if 
traditional productivity analysis indeed underestimates the efficiency of subsistence and semi-
subsistence farmers by employing a Conditional Data Envelopment Analysis (CDEA) using 
household survey data from Uganda. Results confirm that naïve estimates of efficiency understate 
the efficiency scores of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers.  The results cast doubt on 
policies, such as extension programs or other information treatments, that are interpret low 
efficiency scores for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as a management shortfall. 
We demonstrate the use of farm technical efficiency as an outcome measure by analyzing data 
from 2008-2012 for farm training program in Armenia. In this program, farmers received technical 
guidance on modern farm techniques.  Two previous evaluations (Schwab and Shanoyan 2016; 
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Fortson et al. 2012) find ambiguous evidence that farm profits increased as a result of the training 
program. The measurement or potential gain from an extension program is captured using farm 
technical efficiency measures instead. We find evidence that the program in Armenia increased 
farm technical efficiency from 2008 to 2012. 
1.4. Contribution 
The dissertation contributes to the literature on agricultural research evaluation and farm 
productivity in three ways. First, we demonstrate theoretically why measures of farm efficiency 
may be useful outcome measures for extension programs, particularly those in developing 
countries.  Second, we demonstrate measures of efficiency for farmers that account for inseparable 
production and consumption decisions. Third, we show the use of farm efficiency as an outcome 
measure using a randomized control trial (RCT) of a farm training program in Armenia, whereas 
most previous literature assesses the impact of treatment on farm households’ profit, yield, and 
input use (Wordofa and Sassi 2014; Davis et al. 2012; Fortson et al. 2012). While the dissertation 
deals specifically with agricultural extension programs, the framework can be easily extended for 
impact analyses of other related agricultural development programs.  
1.5. Organization  
The rest of the dissertation is presented as follows. Chapter 2, presents the comparison of farm 
technical efficiency versus output and income as outcome variables to evaluate development 
programs such as agricultural extension. Chapter 3, presents the demonstration of modeling farm 
productivity, such as technical efficiency for farmers that are heterogeneous in transaction costs, 
quality of crops and other factors, applied especially, to farmers in developing countries, using 
farm household data from Uganda. Chapter 4, presents the evaluation of an extension program 
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using an impact of randomized control trial (RCT) farm training on technical efficiency and farm 


















Chapter 2. Modeling the Impact of an Extension Program on Profit and 
Efficiency 
2.1. Abstract 
We show the comparison of estimating technical efficiency versus farm output and income as an 
outcome variable to evaluate the impact of farm education and extension programs. We develop a 
simple theoretical model which shows that using technical efficiency as an outcome variable for 
assessing effectiveness of farm education and extension program, could be a viable alternative to 
more traditionally used outcome variables such as farm output and farm profit. We note that when 
farmers are capital constrained, extension programs can theoretically have a large efficiency effect 





Governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) heavily invest in agricultural 
extension programs that assist farmers in obtaining information, skills, and technologies that 
increase agricultural production and improve income and well-being of farm households. 
Agricultural extension programs that provide farmers with the most updated information on new 
techniques and technologies can help to increase farmers’ income through increases in technical 
efficiency or management (Cole and Fernando 2014). Information plays a key role in adoption and 
integration of new technologies. Duflo, Kremer and Rabinson (2008) note that a lack of 
information can constrain farmers from adopting profitable technologies. Extension programs 
provide information to farmers directly (through training, printed documents, demonstrations), 
such as in Fortson et al. 2012, or via mobile-based technologies (Cole and Fernando 2014). 
Agricultural researchers are frequently asked to evaluate the effectiveness of agricultural extension 
programs. In most impact evaluation studies, the availability of data is a common challenge (Athey 
and Imbens 2017; Davis et al. 2012). Thus, researchers tend to rely on methodological 
improvements, new tools and approaches for enhancing their ability to fully and accurately capture 
program impact (Davis et al. 2012).  The improved ability to accurately and credibly evaluate the 
impact of extension programs can result in more efficient allocation of limited funds and resources 
(Moyo et al. 2007). With increasing demand and declining supply of development funds, the need 
for more innovative and rigorous impact evaluation methods is becoming critical for international 
development in general and for extension and technology transfer programs. Similarly, if the full 
impact of a development program is not adequately captured and some key benefits go undetected, 
the case for allocating funds for such programs may weaken unnecessarily.  
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To our knowledge, there are only a few studies that assess the effectiveness of extension program 
using credible research designs. These studies assessed programs by analyzing changes in farmer’s 
income, and output (Cole and Fernando 2014; Wordofa and Sassi 2014; Davis et al. 2012; Fortson 
et al. 2012). The results are mixed. For example, Cole and Fernando (2014), examined the impact 
of mobile-based extension programs on cumin and cotton output between 2012 and 2013 in India 
using a randomized control trial  and found the program increased output of both crops. Wordofa 
and Sassi (2014) also assessed the impact of extension programs on farmers’ income in 2013 using 
cross sectional data in Ethiopia using propensity score matching method. They showed that the 
extension program increased farmer’s income.  
However, Davis et al. (2012), evaluated the impact of extension programs on output and income 
between 1999 and 2008 across three eastern Africa countries: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using 
propensity score matching and covariate matching methods. Results show that extension programs 
increased output and income in Kenya and Tanzania, but not in Uganda. Another interesting 
finding from the Davis et al. (2012) results were that, even in Kenya and Tanzania, land poor 
farmers didn’t benefit as much from the program as compared to their counterparts.  
Two other previous studies, Schwab and Shanoyan (2016) and Fortson et al (2012), examined the 
effectiveness of farm training program between 2007 and 2012 in Armenia.   The Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Compact (MCC) launched a farm training program that increases 
agricultural performance, which in turn increases farmers’ income in 2007/8 in Armenia. The farm 
training includes: training on farm water management, high value agriculture production, post-
harvest management, processing, marketing, and access to credit. Fortson et al 2012, using an 
intention to treat (ITT) approach, found the program did not change average output, and found 
positive but not robust or precisely estimated effects on farm income and profits on program 
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effectiveness.  Schwab and Shanoyan (2016), using the same data, attempted to correct for two-
sided non-compliance in the data by estimating local average treatment effects (LATE), using 
randomization as an instrument.  They find similar results, though the positive impacts on farm 
profits are larger and slightly more precisely estimated.  Overall, the evaluations using traditional 
outcome measures provide an ambiguous picture of the impact of extension program, and do not 
provide persuasive evidence for a strong effect at times. 
Using technical efficiency as an outcome variable for assessing effectiveness of farm education 
and extension program could be a viable alternative to the more traditionally used outcome 
variables. In this paper, we do not consider the level or type of extension programs offered as a 
choice variable. We assume that program assessment is conducted ex post or after program has 
taken effect. Another interesting question not address here, is the optimal level or type of extension 
program that could be offered in a particular situation. An extension program with no or little 
impact on profit may still have positive impact on technical efficiency for subsistence and semi-
subsistence farmers that are often beset by input constraints. Subsistence farmers refers to small 
scale farming primarily operate to produce food for family consumption. Commercial farmers refer 
to farming primarily operate to produce food for profit. And semi-subsistence farmers are between 
the two (refer to farmers that sell less than 50 percent of the total production). Extension programs 
that provide up-to-date information about farming increases farmer’s knowledge, which is 
translated into a more efficient allocation of inputs (technical efficiency).  
The theory underlying the development and usefulness of extension programs is the idea that they 
affect farmer’s knowledge, which should translate into a more efficient allocation of inputs 
(technical efficiency). Technical efficiency is the ability of a production firm to avoid waste 
through producing maximum output for a given technology or producing an output level using the 
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minimum level of input required (Farrell 1957). Increases in technical efficiency thereby often 
increase output, which then may increase farm income. For simplicity, assume that a farmer 
produces a single output using a single input and technical efficiency is defined as output over 
input use. The measure is called average productivity (Battese and Coelli 1988).  There are three 
stages of the production process: stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3, assuming that some factors of 
production remain fixed, while other inputs vary (see figure 1).  
Figure 2.1: Three stage of production function (Stage I to III) 








Stage 1 ranges from the beginning of the production function until the point where average 
productivity (APP) reaches its maximum and is equal to Marginal Physical Product (MPP). MPP 
is the change in total output per unit input. Stage 2, ranges from the end of stage 1 until the point 
where MPP becomes zero or Total Physical Product (TPP) reaches its maximum. TPP is the total 
output produced. Stage 3 encompasses the remainder of the production function or where TPP falls 
and MPP is negative. Average productivity (APP), measure of technical efficiency, increases 
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throughout stage 1 and then decreases throughout stages 2 and 3. Output and profit of a farmer 
increase with an increase in technical efficiency, keeping input and output prices constant. 
However, in stage 1 of the production process, relative changes (percentage change) in technical 
efficiency are likely greater than relative changes in a profit. The relative changes in profit, which 
is equal to the difference between relative changes in total revenue and total cost are lower in 
magnitude than the relative changes in technical efficiency. For farmers that operate in stage one 
of the production process, extension programs could theoretically result in lower impacts when 
using farm income than technical efficiency.  
Stage one is commonly referred to as an irrational stage of production, as any input allocation 
corresponding to this stage will be non-optimal.  However, as Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011); 
Jack (2011) and Stifel and Minten (2008) note, farmers in developing countries are often faced 
with several constraints to agricultural production.  Credit constraints and input market 
imperfections may prevent farmers from using optimal levels of inputs.  Crucially, these 
constraints suggest underutilization of inputs, which implies that farmers may choose ‘irrational’ 
input levels for reasons other than information constraints. Hence, depending on the stage of the 
production, technical efficiency may be a more viable option to income when evaluating extension 
programs. 
However, the use of farm technical efficiency directly as an outcome variable for evaluating 
extension programs has been relatively limited in previous work. The purpose of this paper is to 
develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of extension programs that explains the 
conditions under which farm technical efficiency is complementary to using farm income or output 
as an outcome measure.  
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2.3. Theoretical Framework for Extension Program Assessment 
2.3.1. Technical Efficiency 
in this chapter, when we refer to treatment effect, we are referring to the impact of an extension 
program. We use the terms “treatment effect(s)” or ‘impact of extension program(s)” 
interchangeably throughout the paper. Treatment effects of the impact of extension programs have 
been traditionally been estimated using output and profit (income) as outcome variables. 
Alternatively, technical efficiency (farm productivity) may be used explicitly as an outcome 
measure to evaluate extension programs. Following Battese and Coelli (1988), we define 






where E is technical efficiency, T is extension program (T) which we refer to as ‘treatment’ 
through the paper, X is inputs, and Y is total output. E, X and Y are all functions of treatment 
effect. 
One can derive the treatment (extension program) effect on technical efficiency using the first 
























If treatment does not affect output ( 
𝜕𝑌(𝑋)
𝜕𝑇
= 0), but improves input allocation (
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑇




0. In this case, the relative change in technical efficiency due to treatment is greater than the 
relative change in output. When the treatment effect using technical efficiency is higher, then we 
learn that farmers are operating at stage two of the production function, that they decrease input 
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use and still produce the same level of output. For farmers who initially produce output at the point 
where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost, extension programs may advise them to reduce 
their input use and produce the same level or more output.  
2.3.2.  Profit and Technical Efficiency 
In this section, we discuss the importance of using profit and technical efficiency as outcome 
variables to evaluate extension programs. The equation for profit (π) is given by the following: 
(3) π(T) = PY(X(T)) −WX(T) 
where P and W are output and input prices, respectively. Assume prices are exogenous and the 
profit function is continuous and differentiable, such that  
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑇
 > 0, and  
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑇2
  < 0 (or concave in T). 
This assumption is valid if markets are complete, where prices (output and input) are determined 
by the market. However, this may not be valid for thin or incomplete markets, where farm 
households consume all of their output.  If farm households use their output produced for home 
consumption, then prices are endogenously determined (Dillon and Barrett 2017, Lafave and 
Thomas 2016; Chang, Huang, Chen 2012; Binam et al. 2004; Jayne 1994; De Janvry, Fafchamps 
and Sadoulet 1991). For the time being, though, our model excludes farmers who don’t participate 
in the market, we will return to this case in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
































𝐸 derived from equation (2) into equation (4) and recognizing that 












Assuming the market is competitive, input prices are equal to the MVP (marginal value product) 
of the input (P*MPP). MVP refers to the value of the output resulting due to an additional unit of 










∗ 𝑃(𝐴𝑃𝑃 − 𝑀𝑃𝑃) 
Equation (6) then allows us to examine when the use of APP or technical efficiency may be 
equivalent to or relatively better than using farm profit or income as an outcome measure to 
evaluate extension programs.  
When 𝐴𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑃𝑃, there is no distinction between using farm profit (income) or technical 
efficiency as an outcome variable. The measures are only different by scale and are relatively the 
same. Disparities occur when 𝐴𝑃𝑃 ≠ 𝑀𝑃𝑃.  
When 𝐴𝑃𝑃 > 𝑀𝑃𝑃, we see that the effect of a program on relative profit incorporates both the 
scaled efficiency effect (the first term on the RHS), as well as the relative value of the difference 
between average and marginal products (second term on the RHS).  This case corresponds to the 
familiar second stage of production, where farmers increase their use of input X to the point where 
marginal revenue (MR) is equal to marginal cost. In this case, using farm profit to examine may 




However, when 𝐴𝑃𝑃 < 𝑀𝑃𝑃, a farmer is in the first stage of production. If 
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑇
> 0, the second 
term on the RHS becomes negative, which means that an increase in farm efficiency due to the 
program may not necessarily be reflected in profits.  For large gaps between APP and MPP, which 
occur close to the inflection point of the marginal product curve in the canonical production 
process, the differential effects of treatment on a technical efficiency may be relatively large. Stage 
one of the production process therefore permits the case that increases in farm efficiency may 
correspond to zero or little changes in profit.  In this stage, increase in relative average productivity 
of inputs exceeds the increase in relative profit (a difference between marginal revenue and cost) 
on a relative basis (e.g. percentage change). This could be common in developing countries where 
farmers often face input constraints (Jack 2011), which potentially lead them to operate in the first 
stage of the production function. Hence, depending on the scenario, technical efficiency is a viable 
alternative to output (such as case 1), or profit (such as in case 2) when examining impact of 
treatment effects, as extension programs could positively affect farmers with constrained input 
use.  
We compared output and profit (income) with technical efficiency derived from single input and 
single output as outcome variables to evaluate extension programs. We recommend a future 
research that compare output and profit (income) with technical efficiency derived from multiple 









Extension programs that provide farmers with the most up-to-date information can potentially 
increase farm output and income through increasing farm technical efficiency. In this paper, we 
show that farm efficiency can be used as a complementary outcome variable to farm output and/or 
profit/income to evaluate extension programs. We develop a simple model that shows that an 
extension program with no or little impact on profit may still have resulted in more efficient 
production behavior for farmers that operate in stage one of the production process. Subsistence 
and semi-subsistence farmers are often beset by input constraints, which potentially leads them to 
operate in the first stage of the production function. We note that when farmers are capital 
constrained, extension programs can theoretically have a large efficiency effect despite little or no 
change in farm profits/income. Alternative methods to evaluate extension programs, such as using 
farm technical efficiency instead of farm income or output as outcome variables can helps to 
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Chapter 3. Modeling Farm Productivity for Heterogeneous Farm Households 
in Developing Countries 
3.1. Abstract:  
Relative to home-consumed crops, production of cash crops requires relatively higher market 
involvement in both the purchase of inputs and the selling of output.  This difference leads to a 
substantial imbalance in the transaction costs associated with the production of each crop. 
Moreover, home-consumed crops may have quality attributes (e.g. color, taste, softness of dough, 
and suitability for certain dishes) not reflected in market prices. Factors such as transaction costs, 
crop quality attributes, and household characteristics are farmer specific and drive a heterogeneous 
price wedge between the market prices for household crop production and the economic value of 
these crops for the household. These distinctions have important implication for farm productivity 
analysis, such as efficiency measurement. The standard approach to measure productivity analysis, 
such as efficiency, assumes that farm households face homogenous price wedges that lead to a 
homogenous set of production and profit functions.  However, the price gap created by transaction 
costs, crop quality attributes, and other household characteristics generally varies among 
subsistence, semi-subsistence and commercial farmers and leads to a heterogeneous set of 
production frontiers. Subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers, who produce largely home 
consumed crops, have potentially greater price wedges than commercial farmers. Failing to 
account for the heterogeneity in price wedges that drive heterogeneity in production frontiers is 
likely to lead to underestimation of the efficiency of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers. We 
test if traditional productivity analysis indeed underestimates the efficiency of such farmers by 
employing a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model for household survey data in 
Uganda. Results confirm that naïve estimates of efficiency understate the efficiency scores of 
subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers.  The results cast doubt on policies, such as extension 
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programs or other information treatments, that are promised on interpreting low efficiency scores 
for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as a management shortfall. 





In most developing countries, improving agricultural productivity growth is considered an 
important strategy for reducing high poverty levels. Agriculture remains a key sector in terms of 
output and source of employment. For example, more than 60% of the African population depends 
on agriculture for their livelihood (Elias et al. 2013). The World Development Report (2008) 
identifies improving agricultural productivity and development as a key pathway to escape 
poverty. Farm households that face different infrastructural constraints (Suri 2011; Ojiem et al. 
2006), credit constraints, information barriers, input market constraints (Duflo, Kremer and 
Robinson 2011; Jack 201; Suri 2011and Stifel and Minten 2008), labor market constraints 
(Henning and Henningsen 2007), socio-economic factors (Ojiem et al. 2006) and non-farm income 
opportunities (Chang et al. 2012) have different access to agricultural inputs and outputs. This has 
a big impact on farm households’ agricultural production decisions.  
Agricultural production in developing countries can be broadly classified into cash versus home 
consumed crops. Cash crops are produced for market sale, while some food commodities are often 
produced solely for home consumption. Production of cash and marketed crops (excess of 
consumption) have relatively higher degrees of market involvement for both the purchase of inputs 
and selling of outputs. As such, transaction costs associated with cash and marketed crops exceed 
those for home-consumed crops.1 Transaction costs include search costs associated with finding 
the best price and quality, transportation costs, negotiations, commissions, cost of screening and 
supervision necessary due to asymmetric information, governmental fees, etc (Henning and 
Henningsen 2007; Masanjala 2006; Key et al 2000; Jayne 1994). The heterogeneous constraints 
such as infrastructure, credit, non-farm income and others across farm households leads to a 
                                                          
1 Transaction costs may be fixed, proportional and variable (see Henning and Henningsen 2007; Key et al. 2000). 
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substantial imbalance in the transaction costs associated with the production of each crop. 
Moreover, farm households who produce cash and marketed crops must also purchase food for 
consumption. Transaction costs reduce the profitability of cash and marketed crops and increase 
the cost of buying home consumed crops from market. Farmers who produce home consumed 
crops do not incur such costs. Moreover, production of home consumed crops may have quality 
attributes (e.g. ease of shelling and processing, color, taste, softness of dough, and suitability for 
certain dishes) that market prices may not reflect (Arslan 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009).  
Transaction costs and crop quality attributes not embedded in the market price, as well as other 
factors such as household characteristics can drive a price wedges between market prices for 
household’s crop production and the economic value of these crops for households. The price 
wedge, the difference between the market price and shadow price of home consumed crops can be 
substantial (Arslan 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009). Arslan and Taylor (2009), for example, 
estimated the shadow price of local maize in rural Mexico using the marginal productivity of labor 
as a proxy. They find that the shadow price of local maize consumed at home 210 percent higher 
than the market price.  
Price wedges, generally increase with market interactions. Price wedges are farmer specific and 
appear in the optimality conditions associated with the farm household’s choice of cash and 
marketed versus home-consumed crops (Suri 2011; Jayne 1994). Heterogeneity in factors that 
drive price wedges leads to heterogeneity in production frontiers. Farm efficiency measures 
assumes homogeneous production frontier, which leads to potentially biased efficiency estimates. 
As a result, consideration of these factors is important for productivity analysis such as efficiency 
estimation. Productivity analysis of farm households that face potentially significant price 
differences may be difficult to assess if these factors are not explicitly addressed.  
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Some farm household models have incorporated price wedges in their analysis (Suri 2011; Arslan 
and Taylor 2009; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Masanjala 2006; Key et al 2000; Jayne 1994). 
However, to our knowledge, research focused on farm households’ productivity measurement, 
especially efficiency analysis, have not considered potential biases arising from price wedges 
(Ghebru and Holden 2015; Peterman et al. 2011: Balcombe et al. 2008; Chavas, Petrie and Roth, 
2005; Rahman, 2003; Wang, Cramer and Wailes, 1996 etc). Such analyses implicitly assume 
failure to produce at the frontier (i.e. ‘inefficiency’) stems from managerial failure (i.e. shortfalls 
in choosing the optimal mix of inputs for a given production technologies), but may in fact arise 
due to the presence of large price wedges (e.g. high transaction costs). 
The standard approach to measuring productivity analysis assumes that farm households face 
homogenous price wedges and homogenous production frontiers.  Price wedges created due to 
heterogeneous transaction costs, crop quality attributes and other factors such as household 
characteristics leads to heterogeneous production frontiers (Suri 2011; Arslan 2011; Arslan and 
Taylor 2009; Henning and Henningsen 2007). Because of significant differences in price wedges, 
subsistence, semi-subsistence and relatively commercial farmers likely have different production 
frontiers. Failure to account for the price wedges underestimates the value of the production of 
home consumed crops, which leads to underestimation of efficiency for farmers who produce such 
crops. If the production frontiers are heterogeneous across farmers, then estimating and comparing 
efficiency of farms without accounting for these factors is useful only to determine levels of 
efficiency ‘as if’ price wedges did not exist.  The purpose of this study is to model farm 
productivity and estimate farm efficiency in a manner that accounts for the influence of 
heterogeneous price wedges across farm households.  
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In this paper, we explicitly model the potential impact of price wedges on farm technical efficiency 
of farmers that make optimal crop choices based on a utility maximizing farm household model. 
As in previous work, we show that the existence of price wedges discourages production of cash 
and encourages production of home consumed crops. The optimal production mix varies due to 
these price wedges. With the increase of such price wedges, a utility maximizing farm household, 
more typically a subsistence farmer, withdraws inputs from cash crops and allocates them toward 
home consumed crop production. All else equal, the magnitude of the price wedges is expected to 
be higher for relatively subsistence farmers who produce crops predominantly for home 
consumption than for commercial farmers.  
We discuss the implication of performing productivity analysis with and without taking price 
wedges into account. We focus here only on estimating technical efficiency, as the methods 
developed here would be similar for estimating other types of efficiency. Infrastructure constraints, 
credit constraints and other input market imperfections could lead to different access to input and 
output markets. Which in turn lead to higher transaction costs. Higher transaction costs lead to 
higher price wedges which may discourage farmers from using some specific agricultural inputs. 
For instance, farmers located in remote area may have less access to agricultural machinery than 
farmers located closer to roads. Farmers with better access to credit or non-farm income 
opportunities could easily afford better agricultural inputs than farmers with low access to credit 
or non-farm income opportunities.  
We measure technical efficiency using unconditional (naïve DEA) and conditional Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). We use conditional DEA to account for heterogeneity in production 
frontiers due to price wedges when estimating the technical efficiency of farmers. Conditional 
DEA measures technical efficiency by grouping farmers who face similar price wedges together 
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and the allowing construction of a separate production frontier for that group. That is, efficiency 
is estimated comparing relatively subsistence with subsistence farmers and commercial with 
commercial farmers. Subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers may be better-off by producing 
home consumed crops over cash and marketed crops. From a profit maximization point of view, 
subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers appear to choose the “wrong” crop production mix, 
which includes more home consumed using fewer modern inputs. However, internalizing price 
wedges into the profit and production analysis may give quite different and more important 
answers to the puzzle of modern input adoption and commercialization.  
We find that naïve estimates of technical efficiency understate the efficiency scores of subsistence 
and semi-subsistence farmers. The average technical efficiency score using naive and conditional 
DEA estimators are 0.48 and 0.68, respectively. The average bias, the difference between 
conditional and unconditional technical efficiency score is about 0.21 (Table 4). This is important 
for development programs, such as extension and other information based programs to identify the 
actual efficiency loss due to managerial inefficiency.  
3.3. Background 
Efforts to increase agricultural productivity often focus on promotion of technological change and 
commercialization (Masanjala 2006; Zeller, Diagne and Mataya 1998; Binswanger and Braun 
1991). Agricultural technological advancement increases agricultural production and farmers’ 
income through increases in per unit productivity. Commercialization further improves farm 
productivity and income via specialization in farm products that farmers may have a comparative 
advantage in producing (Barrett 2008; Binswanger and Braun 1991). Significant development 
resources have been invested by both domestic and international agencies in teaching subsistence 
farmers about modern agricultural inputs and high value, commercial products under the belief 
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that farmers lack awareness and knowledge (Sturdy, Aquino and Molyneaux 2014; Elias et al. 
2013; Fortson et al. 2012). Such extension programs often seek to provide farmers with technical 
and practical information about the management of modern technologies, often with the goal of 
alleviating information constraints to profitable technology adoption (Jack 2011).  
However, adoption of modern agricultural technology, particularly in many parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, remains low, and agricultural output and employment continue to be dominated by 
subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers (Suri 2011; Binam et al. 2004; Zeller, Diagne and 
Mataya 1998; Jayne 1994; De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991). These farmers largely 
produce food crops for home consumption and supply excess to the market. Several studies show 
that many farmers in developing countries continue to produce a high proportion of home 
consumed commodities, even though researchers identify higher returns from cash commodities 
(Suri 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Masanjala 2006; Key et al 
2000; Jayne 1994).  
Transaction costs remain a fundamental reason for the lack of market specialization. Key et al. 
(2000) delineate a clear link between transaction costs and agricultural household market 
participation. Small holder farmers are often surrounded by thin (few buyers and sellers) and 
incomplete markets. Thin and incomplete markets increase the cost of exchanging goods and 
services (Dillon and Barrett 2017; Lafave and Thomas 2016; Chang, Huang, Chen 2012; Henning 
and Henningsen 2007; Masanjala 2006; Key et al. 2000; Omamo 1998).  
In well-functioning markets, input and output prices are exogenously determined by the market, 
and production and consumption decisions are separable. However, in thin and poorly functioning 
markets, farm household’s input and output prices are endogenously determined by their shadow 
prices, which differ from the prevailing market prices (Barrett 2008). The difference between the 
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market price and economic value of the crop to the household is called a price wedge. When farm 
households find it optimal to satisfy family consumption from their own agricultural production, 
then the shadow price (opportunity cost of consuming the crop) is influenced by both supply and 
demand factors, leading to inseparable production and consumption decisions (Dillon and Barrett 
2017, Lafave and Thomas 2016; Chang, Huang, Chen 2012; Binam et al. 2004; Jayne 1994; De 
Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991; Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986).  
The shadow prices are household specific and are an important determinant of the adoption of 
modern inputs, high value crops and commercialization. Because of differences between the 
market price and the shadow price, farm households may find adoption of modern inputs and 
production of cash (commercial) outputs, such as high value crops, unprofitable (Shamdasani 
2016; Suri 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009). Factors that may contribute to differences in transaction 
costs for instance and hence to differences between market and shadow prices are variation in 
credit access, infrastructure settings, biophysical factors, socio-economic factors, and off-farm 
income opportunities (Zhao and Barry 2014; Chang et al. 2012; Tittonell et al. 2007; Ojiem et al. 
2006; Nehring et al. 2005; Zeller et al. 1998; Jayne 1994).   Understanding these price wedges is 
essential to understanding how farm households prioritize the production of cash and versus home 
consumed crops. Failure to account for such wedges can mislead policy makers into believing that 
knowledge gaps are the primary barrier to production of cash crops over home consumed crops, 
as such ‘high value’ crops appear profitable under market prices.  
Profit maximizing farmers intend to produce cash crops over home consumed crops if the market 
price is high enough to cover the costs of buying home consumed crops (Henning and Henningsen 
2007; Key et al 2000; Jayne 1994). If the return from marketed crops is lower than the cost of 
buying home consumed crops, including any foregone value from non-priced quality attributes of 
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home-produced crops, then it is rational for farmers to choose to produce home consumed over 
cash crops (Arslan and Taylor 2009). The return for farmers who produce home consumed crops 
is lower by the amount equal to the price wedges.  
Accounting for price wedges, production of high values crops can become unprofitable for 
subsistence and some of the semi-subsistence farmers. On the other hand, use of modern 
technologies and production of high value crops are still profitable for other, relatively commercial 
farmers. Price wedges appear in the optimality conditions of production and play a significant role 
in the choice of cash and marketed versus home-consumed crops. Price wedges generally vary 
between subsistence, semi-subsistence and relatively commercial farmers and lead to 
heterogeneous sets of profit and production frontiers. Hence, the evaluation of farmer’s 
productivity needs to account for these heterogeneous sets of production frontiers between 
subsistence, semi-subsistence and commercial farmers.  
3.4. Theory 
We present a theoretical model to illustrate the potential influence of price wedges (Arslan and 
Taylor 2009; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Key et al 2000; and Jayne 1994). Using a farm 
household model, we explicitly model profit and production decisions that account for price 
wedges. We explain the implication of price wedges in measuring efficiency. We define two types 
of crops: cash (𝑚𝑖) and food crops (ℎ𝑖). Food crops can be home consumed crops (𝑜𝑖)  and/or 
marketed (excess of home consumption) (𝑔𝑖) crops.  Farmers may specialize in production of cash 
crops or food crops or a combination of both. Assume that total output produced (𝑄𝑖) is a 
combination of cash (𝑚𝑖) and food crops (ℎ𝑖) produced using a fixed vector of inputs 𝐴𝑖, where it 
is given by:  𝑄𝑖 = 𝑓(ℎ𝑖;  𝑚𝑖;  𝐴𝑖). To simply the analysis, we assume inputs available for 
production are fixed (i.e. for land inputs see Arslan and Taylor (2009) and labor inputs see De 
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Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991). We assume production is separable for cash and home 
consumed food crops. Thus, we have a separate production functions for cash crops (𝑚𝑖) and home 
consumed crops (ℎ𝑖). This case may arise when some farmers choose to specialize completely in 
cash crops; produce specially crops that are only for sale at the market; certain crops are produced 
communally; among other reasons. Input allocation is still constrained and connects the production 
process for both types of crops as 𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖, where 𝐴𝑖 is the vector of fixed inputs such as  
family and hired labor (L) and capital (K) available for production, 𝐴ℎ𝑖 is the vector of inputs 
allocated to food crop production, 𝐴𝑚𝑖 is the vector of  inputs allocated to cash crop production. 
In our model, farm households maximize utility (𝑈𝑖), through production of cash, and/or food 
crops subject to an income constraint, production technology and availability of inputs.  
Transaction costs reduce the effective prices received from cash crops and increase the cost of 
buying home consumed crops. Assume that utility (U) and production functions (𝑓) are concave 
and twice differentiable. 
The ith farm household’s optimization problem is modelled as follows: 
(1)      max
 𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖; 𝑔𝑖;𝐴ℎ𝑖,𝐴𝑚𝑖 
U = (𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖 ; 𝑍𝑢𝑖) 
s.t: 
(2) (𝑝𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑚𝑖 + (𝑝𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖)𝑔𝑖 − (𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖 = 0 
(3)  𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖;  𝑧ℎ𝑖) = ℎ𝑖       
(4) ℎ𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑜𝑖  
(5)  𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖;  𝑧𝑚𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖       
34 
 
(6)  𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 
(7) 𝑜𝑖, 𝑔𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0,  
where ℎ𝑖 is the food crop for farm household i, 𝑚𝑖 is cash crops, 𝑜𝑖 is food crops produced for 
home consumption, 𝑔𝑖 is food crops sold to the market,  𝑛𝑖 is purchased items used for home 
consumption,  𝑝𝑚 is the per unit net price (revenue minus cost)  for cash crop, 𝑝𝑔 is the per unit 
net price (revenue minus cost)  for food crop sold, 𝑝𝑛 is the per unit output price for purchased 
crops, 𝑡𝑚𝑖 is the per unit output transaction costs (such as fixed, proportional and variable 
transaction costs) associated with marketing and selling cash crops, 𝑡𝑔𝑖 is the per unit output 
transaction costs (such as fixed, proportional and variable transaction costs) associated with 
marketing and selling food crops sold, 𝑡𝑛𝑖 is vector of per unit transaction costs (such as fixed, 
proportional and variable transaction costs) associated with buying consumed items, 𝑍𝑢𝑖 is vector 
of utility shifters (e.g. farm household characteristics), 𝑧𝑚𝑖 is a vector of production shifters for 
cash crops,  𝑧ℎ𝑖 is vector of production shifters for food crops (e.g. improved seed), 𝑇𝑖 is other net 
income such as off-farm, transfers, government payments, and 𝑓𝑖 is a production function. Farm 
households are constrained by income, given by equation (2), production technology, given by 
equations (3) and (4), and input allocations, given equation (5).  
We assume that the marginal return of inputs is positive and subject to diminishing marginal 
returns. In addition, we assume the production functions are concave in the level of inputs used, 




> 0, 𝑓ℎ𝑖 = 
𝑑ℎ𝑖
𝑑𝐴ℎ𝑖
> 0, 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖 = 
𝑑2𝑚𝑖
𝑑𝐴𝑚𝑖
2 < 0, 𝑓ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑖 =
𝑑2ℎ𝑖
𝑑𝐴ℎ𝑖
2 < 0. 
35 
 
Substituting ℎ𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖;  𝑧ℎ𝑖) and 𝑚𝑖 =  𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖;  𝑧𝑚𝑖), we have the following Lagrangian 
function:   
 (9)  𝐿 = U(𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖  ; 𝑍𝑢𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖[(𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖) 𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖;  𝑧𝑚𝑖) + (𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) (𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖;  𝑧ℎ𝑖) − 𝑜𝑖) −
(𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖] + 𝑟𝑖[𝐴𝑖 − (𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖)] 
Which can be used to determine the optimal level of production of cash and food crops, as well 
as optimal input allocation that will maximize utility. 
From equation (4), 𝑔𝑖 = ℎ𝑖 − 𝑜𝑖, or the amount of food crops sold is equal to total food crops 
production minus food crops used for home consumption. 
The first order conditions (FOCs) for maximizing equation (9) are: 







− 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) = 0 ⇒ 𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) = 0; 
(ii) for purchased food crops: optimal consumption of purchased crops is governed by: 






− 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) = 0 ⇒ 𝑀𝑈𝑛𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) = 0; 





= 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖)𝑓ℎ𝑖(𝐴ℎ𝑖) − 𝑟𝑖 = 0; and  







=  𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑓𝑚𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑖) − 𝑟𝑖 = 0;  
where 𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖 is the marginal utility of consuming food crops, 𝜆𝑖 is marginal utility of income, and 
𝑀𝑈𝑛𝑖 is the marginal utility of consuming purchased goods.  
To estimate prices for home consumed crops, we optimize utility with respect to outputs and input 
allocations. Implicitly, households optimize output by optimally choosing inputs. Using the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, we can derive the optimal conditions, including the 
corner solution, for producing food versus cash crops.  
The optimal decision prices for farm crops sold, consumption crops bought and farm crops 
consumed are similar to those in Arslan (2011), Arslan and Taylor (2009), Henning and 
Henningsen (2007), Key et al. (2000), Jayne (1994), and De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 
(1991).  The net prices for each potential crop is given by the following: 






𝑃𝑚 − 𝑡𝑚 ,      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠
𝑃𝑔 − 𝑡𝑔 ,      𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑
 𝑃𝑛 + 𝑡𝑛 ,         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖
,        𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠
  
A detailed derivation of the above prices is provided in the appendix.  





𝑀𝑈ℎ𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖 represent the marginal utilities of home consumed crops and income, respectively       
(see De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991). Define 𝜑𝑖 as the price wedge, or the difference 
between the shadow (
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖






− 𝑝𝑔.  




= 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖  .  
where 𝑃𝑔 is the market price of home consumed crops if it is sold to the market. 
Price wedges are functions of several factors. The household saves 𝑡𝑔𝑖, the amount that would have 
been paid if the household sold the crop to the market. That is, the market value is higher by 𝑡𝑔𝑖. 
Moreover, production of food crops might have embedded quality attributes that are not reflected 
in the market prices (see Arslan 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009). Assume that the market values of 
these quality attributes for the household are equal to  𝜃𝑖. There could also be other household 
characteristics (socio-cultural, preferences etc.) and factors that affect price wedges. The price 
wedges (𝜑𝑖) then is a function of the transaction costs (𝑡𝑔𝑖) (Henning and Henningsen 2007; Key 
et al. 2000), crop quality attributes (𝜃𝑖) (Arslan 2011; Suri 2011; Arslan and Taylor 2009) and 
these other factors (e.g. household characteristics) (Suri 2011; Ojiem et al. 2006 and Jayne 1994). 
The objective here is to show that profitability and productivity analysis of farm households 
explicitly must incorporate price wedges. The next step is to derive the optimal condition for 
maximizing utility of cash versus food crops accounting for price wedges. We have three cases to 
determine the optimal solution or product mix; two boundary solutions and one interior solution. 
Case 1: interior solution:  𝑚𝑖 ≠ 0, ℎ𝑖 ≠ 0. 
From equation (10) and (12): 
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(18) 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 where 𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 = 𝑓ℎ𝑖(𝐴ℎ𝑖) is the marginal productivity of inputs used for food 
crop production. 
From equation (13) and (18): 
(19) 𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 where 𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 = 𝑓𝑚𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑖) is the marginal productivity of 





𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 = (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 
Note that the 
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖
 is the shadow price for home consumed crops, which is equal to 𝑃𝑔 +𝜑𝑖. 
If we replace 
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖
 by 𝑃𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖 in equation (20), then the equilibrium point of production can be 
written as: 
(21) (𝑃𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖) 𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 = (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖  
If (𝑃𝑔 + 𝜑𝑖) 𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 ≥ (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 , farmers start to move input/s toward home consumed 
crops, decreasing marginal productivity for home consumed crops and increasing marginal 
productivity for cash crops, and vice-versa. At equilibrium, the ratio of marginal physical (MP) 








When the an interior equilibrium is unique, (𝑝𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖)𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖= (𝑝𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖, and farmers 
allocate resource between home consumed and cash crops until the point where the shadow value 
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of the marginal product of allocating the resources to home consume crops is equal to the marginal 
value of resources allocated to cash crops.  
Case 2: Boundary solution:ℎ𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑖 = 0.  
This occurs when only home consumed crops are profitable for the farmers. A farmer allocates all 
the inputs to home consumed crop production.  
Under this case; (𝑝𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 ≤ (𝑝𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖)𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 , which implies that the value of the 
contribution of allocating one unit to cash crops is always less than the contribution of allocating 
one unit to home consumed crop. The farmer allocates all the inputs to home consumed crops and 
zero inputs to cash crops, implying 𝐴𝑚𝑖 = 0, and 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖. Case 2 represents the optimal 
allocation for subsistence farmers. 
Case 3: Boundary solution:𝑚𝑖 ≠ 0, ℎ𝑖 = 0.  
This occurs when only cash crops are profitable for the farmers. A farmer allocates all the inputs 
to cash crop production.  
Under this case; (𝑝𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖)𝑀𝑃ℎ𝑖 ≤ (𝑝𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑀𝑃𝑚𝑖 , which implies that the value of the 
contribution of allocating one unit to home consumed crops is less than the value of the 
contribution of allocating one unit to cash crop. The farmer allocates all the inputs to cash crops 
and zero inputs to food crops, implying 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 0, and 𝐴𝑚𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖. It is more profitable to buy food 
crops for home consumption than to produce them. Case 3 represents the optimal allocation for 
commercial farmers. The effects of changes in price wedges on farm household’s optimality 
conditions can be examined using second order derivatives. 
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3.5. Comparative Statistics of the Change in Price Wedge Between Cash and Food 
Crops Production 
From equations (12) and (13),  
(24) (𝑃𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖(𝑡𝑔𝑖))𝑓ℎ𝑖(𝐴ℎ𝑖) = 𝑟𝑖 
(25) (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑓𝑚𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑖) = 𝑟𝑖, and 
(26)  𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖  
We perform total differential of the system to examine how changes in price wedges due to change 
in factors of price wedges such as transaction costs affect farm household decisions to allocate 
inputs toward cash versus home consumed crop production. 
From equation (24), (25) and (26), the Hessian determinants or total differential of the system are: 
[ 
(𝑃𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖(𝑡𝑔𝑖))𝑓ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑖        0       − 1  
0                (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖  − 1














The Jacobian determinant is: J= (𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖+ (𝑃𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖(𝑡𝑔𝑖))𝑓ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑖 < 0 
𝑑𝐴ℎ𝑖 = −𝑑𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑓ℎ𝑖 − 𝜑𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑓ℎ𝑖 − (−𝑑𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑓𝑚𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑓𝑚𝑖) +  𝑑𝐴𝑖 ((𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑖) 
𝑑𝐴𝑚𝑖 = (𝑃𝑔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖)𝑓ℎ𝑖(𝑑𝐴𝑖) + (−𝑑𝑃𝑔𝑖𝑓ℎ𝑖 − 𝜑𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑓ℎ𝑖) (−1) − (−𝑑𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑓, + 𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑓𝑚𝑖(−1).  














































The price wedge is a function of transaction costs, crop quality attributes and household 
characteristics. Increases in price wedges due to either of these factors affect the cash versus food 
crop production decision of farmers. For instance, an increase in transaction costs (𝑡𝑔𝑖) increases 
the price wedges (𝜑𝑖), which discourage production of cash crops (equation (31)) and encourages 
the production of home consumed crops (equation (28)) and vice-versa. A sample of farmers facing 
heterogeneous transaction costs and other factors that contribute to price wedges will result in a 
heterogeneous production frontier. Thus, accounting for such heterogeneity in production frontiers 
is important when measuring efficiency.   
3.6. Impact on Efficiency Analysis 
We have demonstrated theoretically that utility maximizing farmers such as subsistence, semi-
subsistence and commercial producers likely have different production frontiers. Following Daraio 




(34) Ψ𝜑𝑖 = {(𝐴, 𝑄)|𝜑𝑖, 𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑄}  
We note that farmers that have higher price wedges (𝜑) allocate more inputs toward production of 
food crops, implying that their total agricultural production has a greater composition of home 
consumed crops (ℎ𝑖) relative to cash crops (𝑚𝑖). On the other hand, farmers that have lower price 
wedges (𝜑) allocate more inputs toward cash crops and have agricultural production that has less 
composition of home consumed crops (ℎ𝑖) and more of cash crops (𝑚𝑖). We also note that if we 
don’t account for price wedges, then we undervalue the return for subsistence and semi-subsistence 
farmers that dominantly produce home consumed crops (due to higher price wedges). 
Undervaluing the returns for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as compared to commercial 
farmers, implies that the production set (𝝭) for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers is lower 
than it would have been, which we interpret it lower efficiency. Estimating efficiency for all 
farmers ignoring the price wedges implies that one may unnecessarily understate the return and 
efficiency of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers who have potentially higher price wedges. 
However, one could correct this issue by allowing one to set separate production frontiers for 
farmers that have similar price wedges (Ψ𝜑𝑖). That is, there will be a separate production sets for 
subsistence, semi-subsistence and commercial farmers which helps to estimate efficiency through 
a comparison within each group that has similar price wedges, instead of across all farmers. This 
helps to overcome the efficiency loss due to price wedges and identify true management shortfalls.   
3.7. Empirical Model 
We test the supposition that accounting for price wedges understates technical efficiency for 
subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers using a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
approach. We use DEA for two reasons. First, DEA is widely used and performs well in estimating 
efficiency for multi-output and multi-input production process. Second, as it constructs production 
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frontiers from the data, mismeasurement of the return to cash versus home consumed crops will 
likely affect the efficiency estimation. It is well documented that non-parametric efficiency 
measures such as DEA are sensitive to heterogeneity across decision making units (Dai and 
Kuosmanen 2014; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978). Conditional DEA was developed to 
account for such heterogeneity (Daraio and Simar 2007; Simar and Wilson 2007). Our contribution 
is to explain the consequences of this characteristic of the DEA method for farm production 
efficiency in a developing country settings, and demonstrate how conditional DEA techniques 
offers a potential remedy. 
The empirical model is presented as follows: First, we measure technical efficiency using a 
conditional DEA technique that accounts for heterogeneous price wedges between market and 
shadow prices (“first-stage”). Second, we examine the impact of various factors on the conditional 
technical efficiency of farm households (“second stage”). 
3.7.1. First Stage of DEA 
Our empirical strategy is to estimate efficiency that accounts for price wedges between market and 
shadow prices. It is based on a novel approach developed by Daraio and Simar (2007), Simar and 
Wilson (2007), and further elaborated and applied by Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012).  Traditional 
efficiency measures under DEA are often criticized for not considering environmental variables in 
the first stage (Daraio and Simar 2007). Environmental variables are variables that do not directly 
impact or are not directly considered in production decisions. Environmental variables may affect 
not only the distribution of inefficiency among farmers, but also the production frontier itself. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) note that ignoring environmental variables in DEA may lead to invalid 
inferences in any second stage evaluations of efficiency scores. To correct the bias in the first 
stage, Daraio and Simar (2007) and Simar and Wilson (2007) propose a methodology to implement 
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DEA conditioned on environmental variables. In the first stage, efficiency calculations are derived 
from comparing the performance of farmers with similar values of the environmental variables. 
We test in our model if ignoring environmental variables in the first stage of DEA leads to invalid 
inferences in the second stage.  
The environmental variables considered here are proxies for the factors that drive price wedges, 
which are often difficult to measure.  For example, transport costs may be known only for those 
households who sell crops, and are likely to systematically differ for non-participants.  The value 
of quality differences may also be unobservable. Instead, we construct a sales index based on the 
percentage of production sold as a proxy for the factors that contribute to price wedges. We 
calculate the percentage of total crop production sold to the market. Our assumption is that these 
factors that drive price wedges are relatively similar among farmers who largely participate in the 
market. On the other hand, a price wedge is likely to be largely similar for subsistence and semi-
subsistence farmers who consume much of their own production. We estimate efficiency 
conditional on the sales indices. Efficiency of a farmer is estimated based on the production 
technology constructed from farmers with similar sales indices. Farmers with similar sales indices 
are assumed to face similar factors that drive price wedges which leads to similar production 
frontiers.  
There could be farmers with identical factors that drive price wedges, but farmers may have a large 
sales index simply due to wealth. If farmers with a high value of sales index are more technically 
efficient than those with a low sales index, separately estimating the efficiency of low sales index 
farms using DEA will artificially increase their efficiency scores. To determine if the sales index 
is indeed simply proxying for wealth derived from higher efficiency, we test if using another 
variable correlated with wealth, but not necessarily with any element of the price wedge, impacts 
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efficiency estimation. We use the value of a households’ radio and television assets as a placebo 
variable to test our proposition. The assumption is that if efficiency estimates conditioning on sales 
index and value of radio and television show similar results, then the sales index is indeed a poor 
proxy variable for factors that drive a gap between market and shadow prices of farm households. 
Conditional DEA estimates technical efficiency within the boundary of farms with similar 
environmental variable values. Consider, farmer i, uses a vector of inputs A to produce a vector of 
outputs Q. Let Z be a vector of environmental variables that impacts the production process. 
Technical efficiency “𝜃” is estimated through examining the performance of the farmer from the 
frontier “𝛹𝑧”, a frontier formed within the bounds of similar farms based on Z.  
The conditional DEA production set is given by: 
𝛹𝑧𝐷𝐸𝐴 = {(𝐴, 𝑄)|𝑍 = 𝑧, 𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑄}  
We estimate technical efficiency (𝜃) using output oriented DEA. The conditional output oriented 
DEA efficiency measure is given by: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑖|𝑍 












= 1, 𝑣𝑗𝑖 ≥ 0       




The efficiency estimation is performed using linear programing (see Badin, Daraio and Simar 
2012). To perform the conditional DEA, we first rank farmers from smallest to largest using the 
value of the environmental variable. For instance, farmers who have the lowest and largest sales 
index are ranked first and last, respectively. Following Daraio and Simar (2007), and Badin, Daraio 
and Simar (2012), we estimate efficiency via grouping at intervals of about 140, or at deciles of 
the sample, which provides sufficient coverage to estimate efficiency within each group. The Sales 
indices are zero (sells nothing) for group one, 0.10-0.30 percent for group 2, 0.31-0.75 percent for 
group 3, 0.76-1.33 percent for group 4, 1.34-2.21 percent for group 5, 2.22-3.48 percent for group 
6, 3.50-5.37 percent for group 7, 5.38-9.46 percent for group 8 and 9.50-100 percent for group 9.    
The total sample size is 1388. The assumption is that farmers in the same groups have similar price 
wedges. The efficiency is estimated based on the performance among 140 farmers, bootstrapped 
1,000 times, which provides confidence intervals in spite of the deterministic nature of DEA (i.e.e 
DEA does not allow noise). The Bootstrap procedure helps to overcome the bias that stems from 
uncertainty of sampling variations (see Simar and Wilson 2000).  
3.7.2.  Second Stage of DEA 
In the second stage of the DEA analysis, we estimate the effect of factors that impact efficiency 
using the following steps. First, we whiten the conditional efficiency scores by removing the effect 
of environmental variable, in this case of the sales index, as in Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012). 
The effect of the environmental variable on conditional efficiency is estimated using a non-
parametric regression, given in equation (35) and (36).  
 (35)   𝜃 ?̂?𝑖 = 𝜇(𝑍)𝑖  + 𝜎(𝑍)𝛿𝑖    
(36) 𝛿𝑖   =
   𝜃
?̂?
𝑖−𝜇(𝑍)𝑖




where 𝜇(𝑍) is the average effect of the sales index on technical efficiency, 𝜎(𝑍) is the dispersion 
of efficiency scores due to the sales index, and 𝛿 is the unexplained (managerial) part of conditional 
efficiency. Average effects of sales index on efficiency, 𝜇(𝑍) are estimated using local polynomial 
(nonparametric) regression as suggested by Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012). Similarly, dispersion, 
𝜎(𝑍) is measured by regressing the square of the residuals from equation (35) on sales index using 
local polynomial regression. Once we get the estimates for 𝜇(𝑍) and 𝜎(𝑍), we calculated the 
whitened efficiency (pure efficiency) using equation (36). These pure efficiency (managerial 
efficiency) values range between 0 and 1. Farms with large 𝛿 values have lower efficiency levels, 
while farms with small 𝛿 values have higher efficiency levels (see Badin, Daraio and Simar 2012). 
Finally, we estimate the impact of factors on the whitened efficiency score using OLS. 
(37)  𝛿𝑓   =
 α𝑓𝐺𝑓+ ε𝑓 
where 𝐺𝑓 are explanatory variables that may impact farm technical efficiency, α𝑓 is a vector of 
parameter, and ε𝑓 is a mean 0 IID error term. 
Simar and Wilson (2007) indicate that if environmental variables affect the production frontier 
then, naïve technical efficiency scores will lead to an incorrect inference about the factors that 
impact efficiency in the second stage.  To test this proposition in our case, we directly compare 
the naïve and conditional DEA estimates. 
Factors that affect farm technical efficiency, which is measured by equation (36) are non-farm 
income, age, family size, extension, education, and gender.2  
                                                          
2 Factors such as non-farm income, age, family size, extension, education, and gender that affect farm 
technical efficiency (see Tiruneh and Geta 2016; Muange et al. 2015; Abebe 2014; Karimov et al. 2014; 
Kitila and Alemu 2014; Thibbotuwa et al. 2013; Beshir et al. 2012; Makombe et al. 2011; Aye and 




Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of key variables used in the study. We use the World 
Bank’s nationally representative Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household survey 
of 2010/2011 from Uganda. Information from survey households pertaining to crop production 
and other variables of interest were extracted from the survey data. The total sample size is 1,388. 
In our sample, the average household head’s age is 56, and the average household has nine  
members. Sixty-seven percent of the households are male headed.  Twenty-two percent of farm 
households have a father who completed elementary school. 
Efficiency estimates using DEA require data on multiple outputs and inputs. In our sample, farmers 
grow a variety of crops such as rice, soybean, maize, beans, cassava, coffee, millet, banana food 
crop, sweet potato, groundnut and sorghum. We categorize inputs into six categories: fertilizer 
costs, pesticide costs, hired labor costs, machinery costs, family labor (measured in hours) and 
land (measured in acres). Crop outputs are converted to revenue using own price for those who 
sell to the market and using average regional prices for farm households who do not sell. 
Farm households earn about 919, 449 Ugandan Shillings of non-farm income per year. On average, 
maize contribute the highest farm household crop revenue share (21%), followed by beans (14%), 
banana food crop (12%), groundnuts (10%), sweet potato (9%), coffee (8%), millet (4%), rice 
(4%), cassava (2%), sorghum (1%) and soybeans, (0.6%). Similarly, farm households incur the 
highest expense for crop production from hired labor (59,263), followed by fertilizer (44, 853), 
pesticide (5,764), and machinery (2,169) Ugandan Shillings per year. Farm households use an 
average of 219 hours of family labor per year. The average land holding, an important farm asset, 
is 4 acres per farm household. Only 30% of the farm households visit extension centers each year. 
On average, farmers sold approximately 27 percent of their crop. Percentage of sales ranges from 
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0 to 100 percent, assuming that farmers with low percentage of sales have high price wedges and 
farmers with higher percentage of sales have lower or zero price wedges. 
3.9. Results and Discussion 
We test if accounting for price wedges impacts the DEA technical efficiency estimation. We 
estimate technical efficiency conditional on a sales index, a proxy variable for price wedges in the 
first stage and determine the factors that affect technical efficiency in the second stage.  
3.9.1.  First Stage of DEA 
Technical efficiency is estimated using a double bootstrapped conditional DEA. To determine the 
extent of bias from ignoring the potential differences between the market and shadow price of 
agricultural output, we estimate technical efficiency twice: once using unconditional DEA (naïve) 
and conditional DEA conditioned on sales index. We calculate efficiency ratios by driving 
conditional efficiency scores by the naive technical efficiency scores. If efficiency of a farmer is 
the same using conditional and naive DEA, then the ratio is equal to 1. A ratio of unity on average 
across the sample implies that factors that drive a price wedge have no role in the calculated 
efficiency level of farmers. If measured efficiency is higher under conditional DEA relative to 
unconditional, then the ratio is larger than 1. A ratio greater than one, implies that the conditioning 
variable of price wedges do in fact impact efficiency measurement. In the case analyzed here, a 
ratio greater than one indicates that estimating efficiency without accounting for the price wedge, 
possibly underestimates the efficiency of farmers with high price wedges. 
Figure 3.1 plots the efficiency ratios of conditional over unconditional DEA with the efficiency 
ratio on the vertical axis and sales index on the horizontal axis. We estimate the relationship 
between the efficiency ratio and sales index using a local-linear non-parametric estimator. The 
effect of sales index on the efficiency ratio is about -4.34 and statistically significant (Table 2). 
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This shows that the efficiency ratio decreases as we move from a lower sales index to large sales 
index, which is evidenced by the fact that efficiency ratios are larger than two at lower levels of 
sales index and eventually approach one when we move toward higher levels of sales index. Thus, 
estimating efficiency without accounting for sales index (price wedges) understates the efficiency 
score of lower sales index farmers (i.e. subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers). 
Underestimation of technical efficiency decreases as we move toward higher values of sales index, 
that is, toward more commercial producers.  We learned that conditional efficiency is larger than 
the unconditional efficiency for subsistence and semi-subsistence, while it is relatively the same 
for commercial farmers. This implies that we fail to reject the hypothesis that unconditional 
efficiency estimation understates the technical efficiency of subsistence and semi-subsistence 
farmers. 
We assume that wealthier farmers have similar price wedges as poorer farmers and simply have 
larger sales index due to large production.  If these wealthier farmers with larger sales index are 
technically more efficient, estimating efficiency of these poorer farmers with lower sales index 
separately may increase their technical efficiency unnecessarily. To account for these issues, we 
test if using another variable correlated with land size or wealth, but not necessarily with the sales 
index impacts efficiency estimation. We use value of a households’ radio and television as a 
variable to test our proposition. The correlation between land size and value of radio and television 
is 0.56. However, the correlation between radio and television and sales index is about 0.07, which 
is very weak. The assumption is that if efficiency estimates conditioned on sales index and value 
of radio and television, show the same pattern of underestimation, that would cast doubt on our 
interpretation that the results in figure 3.1, stem from failing to account for the price wedge in 
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household optimality conditions. Instead, we may simply be artificially inducing the pattern by 
grouping households according to a variable, like wealth, correlated with true efficiency. 
We present the results calculating the efficiency ratio conditioning on the value of radio and 
television is in figure 3.2. The effect of radio and television index on efficiency ratio is -0.03 and 
statistically insignificant (Table 3.3). The efficiency ratio for lower value of radio and television 
farmers is below two and doesn’t decline when we move toward higher values of radios and 
television. Unlike the use of sales index as a condition variable, there is no clear pattern as the 
value of household assets increase. This suggests that the pattern of bias detected by conditioning 
on sales index is not induced by a spurious relationship with wealth, and is, instead, likely a result 
of price wedge factors. 
Unconditional and conditional on sales index mean efficiency estimates are reported in Table 3.4. 
The average efficiency using unconditional (naïve) and conditional DEA are 0.48 and 0.68, 
respectively. The average bias (conditional minus unconditional efficiency) across the sample is 
approximately 0.21 (Table 3.4).  The efficiency conditional on sales index is 44 percent more than 
the efficiency estimated using unconditional DEA. Efficiency estimation using unconditional DEA 
may be misleading for information based development programs such as extension programs that 
interpret the low efficiency score completely as management shortfall.  
Previous studies that measure farm technical efficiency using unconditional DEA (Mugabe and 
Etienne 2016; Ghebru and Holden 2015; Peterman et al. 2011: Balcombe et al. 2008; Chavas, 
Petrie and Roth, 2005; Rahman, 2003; Wang, Cramer and Wailes, 1996 etc) likely underestimate 
the efficiency of subsistence farmers which could lead to biased inferences. Conditional DEA to 
measure efficiency has been applied in other areas such as health science (Halkos and Tzeremes 
2011), environmental sciences (Halkos and Tzeremes 2014) and public services (Zschille 2015). 
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For instances, Halkos and Tzeremes (2014) examined the impact of Kyoto protocol agreement on 
countries environmental efficiency using conditional DEA. They found that unconditional 
efficiency was biased as high as 24 percent in some countries. 
3.9.2.  Second Stage of DEA 
To examine factors that affect efficiency in the second stage, we whitened the conditional 
efficiency as suggested by Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012). Whitened technical efficiency is 
calculated using equations (35) and (36). Examining the effect of factors on the whitened technical 
efficiency gives more correct inferences (Daraio and Simar 2007; Simar and Wilson 2007). We 
present factors that affect unconditional efficiency (Table 3.5) and conditional efficiency (Table 
3.6). However, we interpret only factors that affect whitened technical efficiency (estimated from 
conditional efficiency) as our unconditional technical efficiency is biased. Results indicate that 
factors that affect whitened technical efficiency at a 5 percent level of significance are gender, 
extension program use and region of residence (Table 3.6).  Gender and Extension have a positive 
effect on whitened technical efficiency. Male farmers are technically more efficient than female 
farmers. Farmers who visit extension services are technically more efficiency than farmers who 
don’t visit. Region 2 has a negative effect on technical efficiency, implies that farmers located in 
region 2 are less efficient than other regions.  
3.10. Summary and Conclusion 
Factors such as transaction costs, crop quality (e.g. color, taste, softness of dough, and suitability 
for certain dishes) and other household characteristics drive price wedges between market and 
shadow prices for crops produced for home consumption. Price wedges are heterogeneous across 
farmers and appear in the optimality conditions associated with the farm household’s choice of 
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cash and marketed versus home-consumed crops. Consideration of price wedges is important for 
measuring efficiency such as technical efficiency.  
The standard approach to measure efficiency is that farm households face homogenous prices 
wedges that lead to homogenous production and profit frontiers.  However, heterogeneous price 
wedges lead to heterogeneous profit and production frontiers. Subsistence, semi-subsistence and 
relatively commercial farmers face difference price wedges and have different profitability and 
productivity frontiers. Failing to account for this heterogeneity due to price wedges across 
subsistence, semi-subsistence and commercial farmers can lead to biased efficiency estimation and 
misleading conclusions. 
In this paper, we explicitly model the potential impact of price wedges on optimal crop choices for 
utility maximizing farm households. We show that the existence of price wedges discourages 
production of cash crops and encourages production of home consumed crops. With the increase 
of price wedges, a utility maximizing farm household, more typically subsistence farmers, 
withdraws inputs from cash crops and allocates them toward home consumed crop production. 
Because of significant price wedges, use of modern technologies, and production of high values 
crops may be unprofitable for subsistence and some of the semi-subsistence farmers.  
Modeling farm productivity that accounts the price wedge helps to have better understanding about 
the lack of use of modern agricultural inputs and producing cash (high value) crops by subsistence 
farmers. Many development programs may invest in teaching farmers such as subsistence and 
semi-subsistence farmers as if they have a lack of knowledge about the modern agricultural inputs 
and high value crops. However, higher price wedges could be the reason behind farmers’ low use 
of modern agricultural inputs and producing cash crops.  
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We measure technical efficiency using unconditional (naïve) and conditional Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). Conditional DEA helps account for heterogeneity due to price wedges when 
estimating technical efficiency of farmers. In Uganda, we find that naïve estimates of technical 
efficiency understate the efficiency scores of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers. This is 
important for development programs, such as extension and other information-based programs to 
identify the actual efficiency loss due to managerial inefficiency. Moreover, this helps on 
designing appropriate extension programs such as teaching about the most profitable inputs 
(modern or traditional) and crops (cash versus food) to the farmers. This also in turn increase the 
effectiveness of the extension program. Under high price wedges, designing development policies 
that consider price wedges is important for the overall effectiveness of the programs. E.g. 
development programs such as extension programs should consider the transaction costs such as 
cost of finding best prices for inputs and outputs, transportation costs, commission costs and etc. 
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3.12. Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Sample Households’ Characteristics (N=1388) 
Variable  Definitions Mean Stand error 
Age Age of head of household in years 56.27 14.56 
Family size Number of household size 8.66 3.43 
Gender  1 if head of household male, 0 otherwise 0.67 0.43 
Nonfarm income  Amount of nonfarm income in dollar 919,449.2 2,956,320.30 
Father Education 1 if farmer completed elementary and 0 otherwise 0.22 0.40 
Rice   Revenue from rice  41,551.21 443,162.3 
Soybean  Revenue from soybean  5,808.476 29,634.71 
Maize   Revenue from maize  210,735.1 451,398.5 
Beans  Revenue from beans  142,810.3 207,651.2 
Cassava   Revenue from cassava  156,769.7 302,190.1 
Coffee  Revenue from coffee  83,830.29 294,418.40 
Millet   Revenue from millet  41,576.44 109,496.20 
Banana home consumed   Revenue from banana home consumed  124,531.40 352,141.00 
Sweet Potato    Revenue from sweet potato  85,743.03 135,266.50 
Groundnut   Revenue from groundnut   95,865.24 226,057.1 
Sorghum  Revenue from sorghum    12,571.16 32,888.79 
Fertilizer  Total cost of fertilizer 44,853.53  187,096.00 
Pesticide  Total cost of pesticide 5,764.87 22,350.99 
Hired labor Total cost of hired labor 59,263.29 111,715.50 
Family labor  Total number of family labor in hours 219.88 119.40 
Machinery  Total machinery cost 2,169.85 8,206.92   
Land Land owned in acres  4.01 3.37 
Livestock  1 if farmer own it, 0 otherwise 0.97 0.16 
Extension  1 if farmer visited extension, 0 otherwise 0.36 0.48 
Sales Percent of production sold to the market  0.27 0.31 
observations 1388 




Table 3.2: Association of Efficiency Ratio and Sales using Kernel Local-Linear Estimator 
 coefficients Std.error P-values 
Constant  2.07 0.03 0.00 
Sales index -4.34 0.12 0.00 
R2    0.05 
 
Table 3.3: Association of Efficiency Ratio and Radio using Kernel Local-Linear Estimator 
 coefficients Std.error P-values 
Constant  1.57 0.02 0.00 
Radio and television  -0.03 0.32 0.10 
R2    0.06 
 
Table 3.4: Technical Efficiency (TE) of Farm Households 
Type of farms Technical efficiency 
Unconditional  0.48 
Conditional  0.68 





Table 3.5: Factors that Affect Naive Technical Efficiency Estimated using Tobit Model 
Variable Mean St. Error P-Value 
Constant 0.358 0.090 0.000 
Age -0.001 0.001 0.729 
Family size 0.014 0.002 0.000 
Gender  0.065 0.019 0.001 
Father education -0.030 0.023 0.200 
Extension  0.082 0.019 0.000 
Livestock ownership 0.049 0.079 0.540 
Region1 -0.073 0.025 0.004 
Region2 -0.125 0.024 0.000 
Region3  -0.147 0.024 0.000 
 
Table 3.6: Factors that Affect Conditional Technical Efficiency using Tobit Model 
Variable Mean St. Error P-Value 
Constant 0.223 0.033 0.000 
Age -0.001 0.001 0.796 
Family size -0.001 0.001 0.191 
Gender  0.016 0.007 0.033 
Father education 0.006 0.008 0.474 
Extension  0.015 0.007 0.045 
Livestock ownership -0.037 0.029 0.203 
Region1 -0.009 0.009 0.336 
Region2 -0.026 0.009 0.004 









                                                          
3 Blue line indicates the non-parametric relationship between efficiency ratio and sales index, and Red line 
indicates efficiency ratio equal to 1. 
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4 Blue line indicates the non-parametric relationship between efficiency ratio and sales index, and Red line 




The ith farm household’s optimization problem is modelled as follows: 
(1)      max
 𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖; 𝑔𝑖;𝐴ℎ𝑖,𝐴𝑚𝑖 
U = (𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖 ; 𝑍𝑢𝑖) 
s.t: 
(2) (𝑝𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖)𝑚𝑖 + (𝑝𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖)𝑔𝑖 − (𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖 = 0 
(3)  𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖;  𝑧ℎ𝑖) = ℎ𝑖       
(4) ℎ𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑜𝑖  
(5)  𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖;  𝑧𝑚𝑖) = 𝑚𝑖       
(6)  𝑄𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 + ℎ𝑖 
 (7)  𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 
(8) 𝑜𝑖, 𝑔𝑖, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0,  
One can replace 𝑔𝑖 = ℎ𝑖 − 𝑜𝑖, i.e. food crops sold is equal to total food crops produced minus 
food crops used for home consumption. 
Substituting ℎ𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖) and 𝑚𝑖 =  𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖), we have the following Lagrangian function:   
 (9)  𝐿 = U(𝑜𝑖; 𝑛𝑖  ; 𝑍𝑢𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖[(𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖) 𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑖) + (𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) (𝑓(𝐴ℎ𝑖) − 𝑜𝑖) − (𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) 𝑛𝑖 +
𝑇𝑖] + 𝑟𝑖[𝐴𝑖 − (𝐴𝑚𝑖 + 𝐴ℎ𝑖)] 
The first order conditions (FOCs) for maximizing equation (9) are: 









− 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) = 0 ⇒ 𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖) = 0; 
If food crop is sold to the market (g), its price (𝑃𝑖) = 
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖
= 𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖.  
Farmers are willing to sell the crop at a price of 𝑃𝑔𝑖 − 𝑡𝑔𝑖.  




 𝑃𝑖 = 
𝑀𝑈𝑜𝑖
𝜆𝑖
,  represents the shadow price for home consumed crop. 
(ii) purchased crops: optimal consumption of purchased crops is governed by: 






− 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) = 0 ⇒ 𝑀𝑈𝑛𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖) = 0; 
If food crop is purchased from the market (n), its price (𝑃𝑖) = 
𝑀𝑈𝑛𝑖
𝜆𝑖
= 𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖.  
Farmers are willing to buy the crop at a price of 𝑝𝑛𝑖 + 𝑡𝑛𝑖. 




=  𝜆𝑖(𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖) − 𝜔𝑖 = 0; where 𝜔𝑖 represents the marginal utility of producing cash 
crop. 
If cash crop is sold to the market (m), its price (𝑃𝑖) = 
𝜔𝑖
𝜆𝑖
= 𝑃𝑚𝑖 − 𝑡𝑚𝑖 .  




Chapter 4. Examining Effectiveness of Agricultural Extension Program in 
Armenia 
4.1. Abstract 
We evaluate the impact of a farm education and extension program on technical efficiency and 
farm productivity in Armenia. Farm productivity and technical efficiency can be used as an 
outcome measures to evaluate extension programs. Two previous studies, Fortson et al. 2012, and 
Schwab and Shanoyan (2016), examined the effect of a farm training program on farm income and 
found no robust farm training treatment effect. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
effectiveness of the farm training program using another complementary outcome variable such as 
farm technical efficiency and farm productivity. Controlling for other variables (e.g. non-farm 
income, education, etc.), the training program had a statistically significant and positive effect on 
catch-up (change in technical efficiency). However, results indicate that farm training had no effect 





Armenia, a former Soviet Union Republic is a land locked country, located in the mountains of the 
Caucasus region between Europe and Asia. The topography of Armenia has a diversity of soil 
types and is fragmented by various systems of ravines. Climatic conditions are equally 
heterogeneous as a result of the level of the mountains. Climatic zones include: arid, semi-arid and 
temperate zones (Tumanian, 2001). Based on the Armenian economy report (2015), services 
contribute the most to GDP (51.9%), followed by industry (27.7%) and agriculture (19.4%). The 
Armenian economy has undergone a profound transformation after independence in 1991, which 
caused a sharp decline in GDP through the mid and late 90s (World Bank, 2001).  
After independence, significant privatization of the public economy took place. Many state-owned 
firms were sold to local buyers (FAO, 2000). State-owned agricultural land was distributed to 
individual farmers.  The government redistributed about 70 percent of farmland as small plots to 
private farmers and retained about 30 percent for state owned large scale farming operations 
(Fortson et al., 2012). However, after the transformation, economic progress did not proceed as 
expected. Firms frequently faced a shortage of capital needed to procure inputs and encountered 
market constraints to selling their output (Shanoyan et al., 2014). Agricultural land was often given 
to inexperienced and resource constrained farmers, which resulted in a dramatic decline in 
agricultural production. Through the 1990s and early 2000s, economic stability remained a key 
challenge in Armenia. To address the challenge, the government, supported by non-governmental 
agencies, initiated various development projects focusing on key investments in the country. One 
of the more recent and largest of these was the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC).  
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To enhance agricultural production and farmers’ income, MCC signed an agreement with Armenia 
in 2006. One aim of the project was to increase agricultural performance by offering farm training. 
The training offered by the program included: training on farm water management, high value 
agriculture production, post-harvest management, processing, marketing, and access to credit. 
Most of the targeted beneficiaries of the project were identified to have limited farming knowledge 
and poor irrigation systems (Fortson et al., 2012). By offering training to farmers, the project’s 
aim was to improve management practices, which in turn could increase farm efficiency and farm 
household income. A companion credit program did not develop past a small pilot during the 
evaluation period, and hence only a handful of farmers were provided access.   
Two previous studies examined the impact of the training program and found ambiguous effects.   
Fortson et al (2012), using an intention to treat (ITT) approach, found the program did not change 
average input use or yield, and found positive but not robust or precisely estimated effects on farm 
income and profits.  Schwab and Shanoyan (2016), using the same data, attempted to correct for 
two-sided non-compliance in the data by estimating local average treatment effects (LATE), using 
the randomization as an instrument.  They find similar results, though the positive impacts on farm 
profits are larger and slightly more precisely estimated (but not robust).  Overall, the evaluations 
using traditional outcome measures of output and income provide an ambiguous picture of the 
program, and do not provide persuasive evidence for a strong effect. However, for farmers who 
are beset by capital constraints such as credit, treatment effects using farm efficiency as outcome 
measure could be more revealing than the treatment effect using farm profit as an outcome 
measure. 
When farmers produce at input levels where marginal physical product (MPP) exceeds average 
physical product (APP), known as Stage 1 of production, treatment effects may produce a 
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commensurately large change in farm productivity as compared to farm profit (see chapter 1).  
While this stage of production is often ignored, as rational producers would not ‘choose’ to produce 
in this region, the population targeted by extension programs are often beset by binding constraints, 
such as credit, that prevent farmers from taking advantage of increasing returns to investment (Jack 
2011), that constrain them to this stage of production.  
In Armenia, firms frequently faced a shortage of capital needed to procure inputs and encountered 
market constraints to selling their output (Shanoyan et al., 2014). Schwab and Shanoyan (2016) 
note that credit was the most effective tool to attract farmers to the training participation in 
Armenia. This implies that farmers may potentially be beset by financial constraints and produce 
sub-optimally in stage 1 of production. Thus, an extension program targeting such farmers that 
shows no or little impact on profit may still have resulted in positive changes in terms of efficient 
production behavior.  As a result, using farm technical efficiency and productivity as an outcome 
measure may allow program evaluators to determine if the extension program provided no positive 
productive effects or if farmer efficiency improved, but was beset by other binding constraints 
reducing or failing to impact farm household income.  
Examining the impact of farm education and extension program on farm technical efficiency and 
farm productivity may help to identify program impacts that farm profit estimates may fail to 
detect. In this study, we assess whether or not the farm training program in Armenia increased 
farm technical efficiency and farm productivity. We use an Armenian panel survey data set 
collected in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 by Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Compact, USIAD 
project. We investigate the effect of treatment on the catch-up effect (change in technical 
efficiency), frontier shift (change in technology) and Malmquist index (overall farm productivity) 
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using conditional DEA. We find that the training program had a significant effect on catch-up and 
no effect on the frontier technical efficiency and overall farm productivity. 
4.3. Theory  
We discussed the importance of using farm technical efficiency as outcome variables to assess the 
effectiveness of farm training and extension programs in chapter 2. We noted that farmers in 
developing countries face input constraints and as a result, operate sub-optimally in stage 1 of the 
production process. For farmers that operate in stage 1 of the production process, using farm 
technical efficiency directly as an outcome variable for evaluating extension programs may be 
more informative than farm income. In stage 1 of the production process, treatment effects (impact 
of extension program) on technical efficiency are likely larger than treatment effects on profit. 
Here, we are exploring whether or not a farm training program increases farm productivity in 
Armenia. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of farm training on changes in technical efficiency 
as an outcome variable. Training improves knowledge, which can make farmers technically more 
efficient and innovative. The most appropriate method to measure this potential gains from farm 
training is the Malmquist index (farm productivity). Farm productivity can be decomposed in to 
two components, a catch-up effect (capture change in technical efficiency) and a frontier shift 
effect (capture gain in innovation) (see Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2007).  
To illustrate the linkage between farm training and technical efficiency of farm households, 
assume training improves farmer’s knowledge by providing new information. As noted by 
Appleton and Balihutan (1996) and Cotlear (1989), training may have two effects. The first is a 
cognitive effect where the training increases skills and proficiency of farmers through 
informational channels. With the increase in skill, farmers can become more creative and do things 
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with fewer resources and in shorter time.  The second is a non-cognitive effect, where attitudes, 
beliefs and habits change in ways that help farmers to adopt productive technology. The effect of 
farm training on technical efficiency is illustrated in figure1.   
Figure 4.1: Production performance of farmers in two time periods, before (Tb) and after 
(Tf) treatment. 
 
Farm households on the frontier such as A and C are fully efficient while farm households below 
the frontier such as B and D are less efficient.  The indices b and f on farm households B and D 
show technical efficiency before and after the training respectively. After the training, the technical 
efficiency of farmer B and D increases from Bb and Db to Bf and Df, respectivily . The two effects 
of treatment can be described by the differences before and after training in the figure:  
technological change, or the frontier shift, is embodied by the change in the frontier (moving from 








change, or catch-up effect, is embodied by the difference in efficiency before and after the program 
(e.g. Bf/Bb or Df/Db) (see Fare et al., 1994). The Malmquist Index measures the overall farm 
productivity change, which is the combination of catch-up and frontier shift effects. Overall farm 
productivity could be change due to efficiency and/or innovation. 
Empirical strategies: We aim to examine impact of farm training on technical efficiency and 
farm productivity in Armenia. There are two common methods to measure technical efficiency 
and farm productivity: Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). DEA is a non-parametric method that does not assume a functional form for the 
production process, and SFA is a parametric method that incorporates random noise. We choose 
to measure technical efficiency and farm productivity using the non-parametric, input oriented 
DEA approach. Since farm households in developing countries have heterogeneous price wedges 
(See chapter 3), we measure technical efficiency and farm productivity using conditional DEA. 
We apply conditional input-oriented DEA that accounts for the importance of price wedges on 
estimating technical efficiency and farm productivity, a method suggested by Daraio and Simar 
(2007) and Simar and Wilson (2007), who note that traditional DEA does not account for 
‘environmental variables’ that are not directly used in production but still affect the production 
decision of farmers. Price wedges driven by transaction costs and other farm household factors 
are such environmental variables. They are not inputs in the production process, but still affect 
the production decision of farmers (see chapter 3).  
Price wedges are often unobservable and are difficult to measure. Instead, we use the probability 
of sales as a proxy for price wedges. Probability of sales is used to measure the degree of 
relationship of farmers with the market. We assume that farmers who have low price wedges are 
highly likely to participate in the market (probability of sales is high) and vice-versa. We estimate 
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technical efficiency and farm productivity based on the production technology constructed from 
farmers with similar probability of sales. Farmers with similar probability of sales are assumed to 
face similar factors that drive price wedges, which leads to similar production frontiers. Hence, 
conditional DEA measures technical efficiency accounting for probability of sales, a proxy for 
price wedges. 
The empirical analysis is structured as follows. First, probability of sales, a proxy for price wedge 
is estimated. Second, we conduct a two stage Malmquist DEA analysis. The first stage estimates 
Malmquist farm productivity index using conditional DEA, where efficiency is conditioned on 
probability of sales. The second stage examines the impact of farm training on the Malmquist farm 
productivity index recovered from the DEA analysis. Details are outlined in the following 
subsections. 
4.3.1.  Predicting Probability of Sales using a Logit Model 
The objective here is to estimate technical efficiency and farm productivity conditional on the 
probability of sales, a proxy for factors that drive price wedges (see chapter 3). Probability of sales 
is predicted using a logit model as follows. 
(1) 𝑍𝑖   =
 α𝐷𝑖+ v𝑖,  𝑍𝑖 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 > 0
 0              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
where 𝐷 is a vector of explanatory variables and 𝑣  is a mean zero, IID error term.  
Explanatory variables are assumed to be linearly related to the probability of sales. The explanatory 
variables include land, districts (farmer location) and farm household characteristics (gender, 
family members, age of head of farm household, etc). These variables were selected based on their 
perceived relationship to probability of sales as supported by economic theory and the applied 
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development literature (Stifel and Minten 2016; Chamberlin and Jayne 2013; Arslan 2011; Vakis, 
Sadoulet and Janvry 2003; Fafchamps 1992).  
4.3.2.  First Stage of Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
We use conditional DEA to estimate the Malmquist farm productivity indices. Consider a vectors 
of inputs A used to produce a vector of outputs Q. Let Z be the environmental variable that impacts 
the data driven frontier function. We assume that a frontier that can be estimated on the conditional 
DEA problem is 𝛹𝑧, which is given by: 
(5) 𝛹𝑧𝐷𝐸𝐴 = {(𝐴, 𝑄)|𝑍 = 𝑧, 𝐴 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑄}  
The conditional input oriented DEA productivity measure is given by: 
(6)  𝜃𝑧(𝐴, 𝑄) = max{𝜃|(𝐴, 𝜃𝑄) 𝜖  𝛹𝑧𝐷𝐸𝐴} 
Malmquist farm productivity index (MI) have four components.  𝜃𝑧(𝐴, 𝑄) can be any of the four 
MI components such as 𝑑𝑡(𝑄𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) (efficiency in second period with respect to frontier in the 
second period), 𝑑𝑠(𝑄𝑠, 𝐴𝑠) (efficiency in first period with respect to frontier in the first period), 
𝑑𝑠(𝑄𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) (efficiency in second period with respect to frontier in the first period) and 𝑑
𝑡(𝐴𝑠, 𝐴𝑠) 
(efficiency in first period with respect to frontier in the second period), where t and s represents 
period first and second in the production. We maximize conditional (𝜃𝑧) productivity of a single-
output and multi-input farmer given input constraints, and production technology.  
  𝜃𝑧(𝐴, 𝑄) can be obtained using DEA linear programing (see Badin, Daraio and Simar 2012; 
Coelli and Perelman, 1996) as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜃𝑖|𝑍 














= 1, 𝑣𝑗𝑖 ≥ 0       
where 𝑣 represents weights, r represents inputs, s represents outputs and i represents observation. 
To perform the conditional DEA, we first rank farmers from smallest to largest using the values 
of the environmental variable. Following Daraio and Simar (2007), Badin, Daraio and Simar 
(2012), and Simar and Wilson (1998), we estimate efficiency via grouping at intervals of about 
100 (10%) farms. The assumption is that farmers in the same groups have similar factors that drive 
price wedges. Efficiency is estimated based on the performance among these 100 farmers, 
bootstrapped 1,000 times. The distance from the frontier is interpreted solely as inefficiency. 
Bootstrap procedures help to overcome the bias that stems from uncertainty of sampling variations. 
The four components of MI are estimated using input oriented DEA conditional on probability of 
sales. Farm households are considered as decision making units.  
The MI can be decomposed in a frontier shift (FS) (technical change) and catch-up effect (CI) 
(technical efficiency change) (Fare et al., 1994). That is: 

























where Z- represents probability of sales. The Malmquist index, measures productivity changes 
between two periods, as a distance function that compares farm productivity at period 𝑡 relative to 
period s, representing the productivity change (change in the technical efficiency and frontier).  
4.3.3. Second Stage of Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (MDEA)  
In the second stage of DEA, we examine the impact of treatment on farm productivity (i.e. catch-
up effect, frontier shift and Malmquist index) using the following steps. First, we whiten the 
conditional productivity measures by removing the effect due to the environmental variable, i.e. 
probability of sales (See Badin, Daraio and Simar 2012). The whitened farm productivity indices 
such as MI, CI and FS are estimated using equations (7) and (8). 
(7)   𝛷 ?̂? = 𝜇(𝑍) + 𝜎(𝑍)𝛿   




where 𝛷 is MI, CI or FS, 𝜇(𝑍) is the average effect of probability of sales on the productivity 
measure, 𝜎(𝑍) is the dispersion of the productivity distribution due to probability of sales, and 𝛿 
is the unexplained productivity of the farm. Average effects of probability of sales on productivity, 
𝜇(𝑍) are measured by regressing probability of sales on productivity using local polynomial 
(nonparametric) regression as suggested by Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012). Similarly, dispersion, 
𝜎(𝑍) is measured by regressing the square of residuals from the equation (7) on probability of 
sales using local polynomial regression. Once, we get the estimates, 𝜇(𝑍) and 𝜎(𝑍), we estimate 
the whitened productivity using equation (8). 𝛿 is a continuous variable. Productive farmers have 
smaller 𝛿 values and the less productive farmers have larger 𝛿 values (see Daraio and Simar 2012; 
Badin, Daraio and Simar 2012).  
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Training was offered randomly to producers at the level of water use associations (WUA). We 
measured the impact of the training on farm productivity indices using the following equation.  
(9) 𝛿𝑖   =
 Π𝑡𝑇𝑖  + ε𝑡𝑖 
where T is the intention to treat for observation i, Π𝑡 are parameters, and ε𝑡𝑖 is mean 0, IID error 
term. 
However, our data indicate that some farmers from the treated WUA did not attend the training. 
On the other hand, some farmers from the control WUAs attended and completed the training. 
There also exists some missing values that can neither be categorized with treatment nor control. 
The training was completely on a voluntary basis. There was no enforcement to attend the training. 
To avoid biased results, we considered only those who completed the training. We use a training 
completion variable, where participants were asked whether or not they completed the training. 
However, training participation is a farmer specific decision that depends on many factors, which 
could be endogenous on the system. To overcome this endogeneity problem, an instrumental 
variable method is used. We use the random assignment of treated and control villages as an 
instrument for training completion. The IV estimation is implemented using a Two Stage Least 
Square method (2SLS). The first step involves fitting a binary response model (probit) for training 
completion (ℎ̂) on the instrument, intention to treat (T).  
(10) ℎ𝑖   =
 Π0 + Π1𝑇𝑖  + Π2𝐺𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 
where ℎ𝑖 is the training completion, 𝐺𝑖 is a vector of control variables i.e. household characteristics, 
Π0, Π1, Π2 are parameters, and 𝜂𝑖 is mean 0, IID error term. 
We also include the results for treatment effect using the original treatment assignment.  
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The second steps follows by regressing farm productivity measures on ℎ̂ and control variables, i.e. 
household characteristics (G). The second stage is estimated using OLS as follows: 
(11) 𝛿𝑖   =
 α𝐺𝑖 + βℎ̂𝑖  + ε𝑖 
where  α and β is parameters, and ε𝑖 is the mean 0, IID error term. 
We test if the unconditional productivity index as compared to conditional productivity index give 
similar treatment effects. Simar and Wilson (2007) indicate that if environmental variables have 
significant effects on the production frontier then, unconditional productivity indices in the first 
stage of DEA leads to wrong inferences in the second stage and recommends that conditional 
productivity index as an appropriate method to use in the first stage.  
We consider non-farm income, age, family size, education, and gender as explanatory variables 
for the second stage.5 
4.4. Data 
We used an Armenian panel survey data set collected in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 by Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. The sample was selected from 189 communities out of which 112 were in 
the treatment group and 77 were in the control group. Communities were randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups. Training was offered to famers in the treatment groups, but not to 
farmers in the control group. The data includes non-farm income sources, household 
demographics, production, income, household expenditure and other agricultural information. 
                                                          
5 Factors such as non-farm income, age, family size, education, and gender associated to farm productivity ((see 
e.g.Tiruneh and Geta 2016; Muange et al. 2015; Abebe 2014; Karimov et al. 2014; Kitila and Alemu 2014; 
Thibbotuwa et al. 2013; Beshir et al. 2012; Makombe et al. 2011; Aye and Mungatana 2010; Speelman et al. 2008). 
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Inputs used are four types namely land (main input), irrigation (main target in the training), labor 
cost and other costs (total cost-irrigation cost – labor cost) and one output, total crop values.  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of key variables for both treatment and control groups.  
Treatment and control group have similar average values on variables such as age, family size, 
gender, level of secondary education, irrigation cost, land, other costs, and livestock ownership. 
However, treatment and control group significantly differ on variables such as non-farm income, 
total values of crop and labor and equipment costs. Average treatment effect could be biased, when 
treatment and control group show significantly different baseline information. Instead, we use 
local treatment effect, measuring treatment effect using control variables. 
 The average age of the households is around 58 years old. The average number of family members 
in the household is 5. The percent of households are headed by female members is 14 percent for 
treated and 13 percent for control group. The number of farm households who completed 
secondary education is 41 percent for the treatment and 39 percent for the control groups. Irrigation 
and other costs respectively are 110 and 310 dollars for the control and 109 and 307 US dollars for 
the treatment group. The treatment group has slightly larger average land (1.51 acres) holdings 
than the control group (1.46 acres). The number of people from the treatment and control groups 
that own livestock are 64 and 61 percent, respectively.  
Regarding non-income per year, farm households in the treatment group earned higher income 
(1397 US dollars) than the control group (1246 US dollars). Similarly, farmers in the treatment 
have higher income from crops and higher labor costs compared to farmers in the control groups. 
The average crop income per year for farm households under the treatment group is 1520 US 
dollars as compared to 1379 US dollars for the control group. The average labor costs per year for 
the treatment and control groups is 281 and 265 US dollars, respectively. The total sample size 
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was 3,996. Due to many zeros across inputs and output, DEA couldn’t construct a frontier and 
estimate technical efficiency in the full sample. After we dropped values with zero total input costs 
and total value of crops, the sample size was reduced to 1554. Since, DEA is sensitive to outliers 
(Ahamed et al. 2015; Timmer 1971), we removed outliers that were 3 times the standard deviation 
above and below the mean. After we remove the outliers, we are left with 1227 number of 
households. Despite these changes, the proportion of treated and control farmers in the estimation 
sample mirrors the original sample (treatment, 61% and control, 39%).  
4.5. Results and Discussion 
We perform farm productivity analysis conditional on probability of sales, a proxy for price 
wedges. Results are structured as follows. First, estimation results for probability of sales, a proxy 
for price wedge is presented. Second, the first stage of the Malmquist DEA, for estimating farm 
productivity indicators such as catch-up (change in technical efficiency), frontier shift (change in 
technology) and Malmquist index conditional probability of sales are presented. Third, the second 
stage of Malmquist DEA for examining treatment impact on farm productivity measures are 
presented. Details are outlined in the following subsections. 
4.5.1.  Prediction Probability of Sales 
Probability of sales, the proxy for price wedges is presented in Table 4.2. It is estimated using a 
logit model. Results show that land size, and household size can be used to predict sales. Land has 
positive association with sales. This matches with Vakis, Sadoulet and Janvry (2003) and 
Fafchamps (1992) findings that farmers that have larger farm size can produce more output and 
can sell larger amounts than farmers with a smaller land size. Household size have negative impact 
on sales. Farm households that have larger households use more crops for consumption than farm 
84 
 
households with smaller households. This matches with the theory that as food consumption need 
increases, farm households allocate more of farm inputs for food crops production than for cash 
crops production.  
4.5.2.  First Stage of Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (MDEA)  
We first measure the correlation between farm productivity ratios and baseline probability of sales 
using local polynomial (non-parametric) regression (Table 4.3). The relationship between these 
ratios and probability of sales is significant, implying that probability of sales, a proxy for factors 
that drive price wedges matters when we measure farm productivity in Armenia. The baseline 
probability of sales has a positive association with catch-up (0.13) and Malmquist index (0.03) and 
negative association with frontier shift (-0.08).  This implies that catch-up and Malmquist index 
increase in probability of sales and frontier shift decreases in probability of sales. Catch-up and 
Malmquist index that measure change in efficiency and farm productivity is higher for commercial 
farmers (high probability of sales) than subsistence farmers (low probability of sales). However, 
the frontier shift that measures change in innovation is larger for subsistence farmers compared to 
commercial farmers. 
Unconditional and conditional farm productivity estimates are reported in Table 4.4. Probability 
of sales has a significant effect on farm productivity, implying that farm productivity measures 
based on unconditional DEA are biased. Hence, we interpret only the conditional farm productivity 
measures. The average catch-up (change in technical efficiency) using conditional DEA is 1.30. 
This implies that on average, farmers over the given period have improved their technical 
efficiency by about 30 percent. The average frontier-shift (technological shift) using conditional 
DEA is 1.50. This indicates that farmers over the given period have increased their technical 
efficiency by about 50 percent. Similarly, the average Malmquist index (change on overall 
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productivity) is about 1.71, which shows that farmers improved their overall farm productivity 
about 71 percent. This is mainly due to improvement in efficiency and innovation.  
The average catch-up, frontier shift and Malmquist index using unconditional DEA are 1.76, 0.67 
and 1.35. The difference between unconditional and conditional DEA farm productivity measures 
is substantial. The average bias, the difference between conditional and unconditional DEA for 
catch-up, frontier and Malmquist indexes is about 0.45, 0.83 and 0.52 respectively.  
4.5.3.  Second Stage of Malmquist Data Envelopment Analysis (MDEA)  
In order to examine the treatment effect in the second stage, we whitened the conditional farm 
productivity, as in Badin, Daraio and Simar (2012). Conditional farm productivity measures are 
calculated using equation (7) and (8). The whitened catch-up effect, frontier shift and Malmquist 
index are shown in figures (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). The whitened farm productivity measures are 
drawn against probability of sales. The whitened farm productivity measures are presented on 
vertical axis and probability of sales on the horizontal axis. The highest whitened farm productivity 
value indicates low performance and lowest value shows best performance (see Badin, Daraio and 
Simar 2012 and Simar and Wilson 2007).  
The impact of probability of sales on whitened farm productivity measures is statistically 
insignificant (Table 4.5). The results agree with the Daraio and Simar (2007) findings, implying 
that whitened farm productivity measures should have no relationship or should be independent of 
the environmental variable (probability of sales). After, we remove the effect of probability of 
sales, a proxy for the price wedge, on farm productivity measures, we can then assess the impact 
of treatment (farm training) on the whitened farm productivity measures. Examining the effect of 
treatment on the whitened farm productivity measures provides more meaningful measure of the 
program’s impact (Daraio and Simar 2007; Simar and Wilson 2007). Unconditional farm 
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productivity measures are biased and inference based on these farm productivity measures is likely 
to be misleading.  
The results for the ITT impact estimates of training on unconditional and conditional DEA farm 
productivity indices is presented in table 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. The impact of training on 
unconditional farm productivity indices are small and insignificant. Conditional measures are 
similar, though the impact on the frontier shift is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, the ITT estimates potentially underestimates the treatment effect due to two-sided non-
compliance, which affected approximately 60 percent of the sample. To overcome this issue, we 
estimate the local average treatment (LATE) to examine the impact of the program. 
The LATE uses instrumental variables to calculate the impact based on the complying sample of 
farmers, or those in the treatment group that attended training and the control group that did not. 
In equation (10), training completion is fitted on the treatment assignment variable. The effect of 
treatment assignment on training completion is positive and statically significant (Table 4.8), 
implying that treatment assignment is a good instrument. We then estimate of the impact of training 
completion on the whitened farm productivity measures using equation (11). Results indicate that 
the LATE estimates on naïve or unconditional and whitened (conditional) farm productivity differ. 
The LATE across all types of naïve farm productivity is statistically insignificant (Table 4.9). 
However, the LATE under conditional farm productivity measure has a positive and significant 
effect on the catch-up effect and an insignificant effect on the frontier-shift (negative) and 
Malmquist index (positive) (Table 4.10). The Malmquist Index is the product of the catch-up and 
frontier shift effects. With a statistically insignificant effect of the extension program on the 
frontier-shift, the impact on productivity is likely to be insignificant as well, given the 
multiplicative nature of the Malmquist Index. It is likely that the farm training, while providing 
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knowledge to farmers, did not result in a significant adoption in technology to result in a shift in 
the frontier over the time period. Instead, farmers likely used the information to better allocate 
their inputs, improving technical efficiency (i.e. the positive catch-up effect), not resulting in an 
improvement in productivity over the time period.  
We find that unlike the naïve (unconditional), the conditional DEA indicates positive and 
statistically significant impact of agricultural extension program on catch-up effect. Unconditional 
DEA-based efficiency estimation could not detect the impact and would underestimate the 
effectiveness of the extension program. The positive and significant impact of agricultural 
extension program on catch-up effect implies that the training improved the productivity of the 
inefficient farmers and helps them to approach or equal in the productivity performance of the 
most efficient farmers. 
4.6. Conclusion  
With increasing demand and declining supply of development funds, the need for innovative and 
more rigorous impact evaluation methods is important for development programs such as 
extension programs. Examining the effectiveness of farm education and extension program using 
farm technical efficiency and innovation as an outcome variable instead of farm income helps to 
adequately capture the program impacts. Farm education and extension programs are thought to 
increase farm income through increase in farm technical and/or innovation. In this study, we 
analyzed the effect farm training on farm productivity of Armenian farmers. We investigate the 
effect of local treatment on catch-up efficiency, frontier shift and Malmquist index using 
conditional DEA. Controlling for other variables (e.g. non-farm income, education, etc.), the 
training program has a statistically significant and positive on catch-up effect and insignificant 
effect on the frontier shift and Malmquist index.  
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Fortson et al. (2012) and Schwab and Shanoyan (2016) examined the impact on farm income, and 
they found no persuasive positive effect. However, using farm productivity as an outcome variable, 
the training proved to provide a positive and significant effect on changes in technical efficiency 
over the treatment period. Using alternative methods to evaluate extension program such as using 
farm productivity instead of farm income as outcome variables helps to identify the impacts that 
would have gone undetected. Mismeasurement of the impact weaken the program unnecessarily 
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4.8. Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Sample Households’ Characteristics 
Variable  Definitions Mean for each group 
  Treatment Control 
Age Age of head of household in years 57.36 57.83 
Family size Number of household size 5.21 5.20 
Gender  1 if head of household female, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.13 
Secondary education 1 if farmer completed high school and 0 
otherwise 
0.41 0.39 
Irrigation cost Amount irrigation cost per year in dollars 108.51 110.14 
Other costs  Amount of costs other than irrigation and 
labor in dollar 
306.92 310.19 
Land Land owned in acres  1.51 1.44 
Livestock  1 if farmer own it, 0 otherwise 0.64 0.61 
Nonfarm income  Amount of nonfarm income in dollars 1397.33 1246.42* 
Total value of crops  Total value of crops per year in dollars  1520.00* 1378.99 
Labor and equipment 
cost  
Amount of hired labor and equipment cost 
per year in dollars 
280.92* 264.54 
Zone 1 Number of farmers from zone 1 349 249 
Zone 2 Number of farmers from zone 2 291 168 
Zone 3 Number of farmers from zone 3 81 41 
Zone 4 Number of farmers from zone 4 7 8 





Table 4.2: Factors associated with crop sales to the market 
Variables Logit model for predicting sales 
 parameters 
 estimates Std. error P-value 
Land 0.25 0.05 0.02 
Gender 0.03 0.25 0.93 
Non-farm income 0.01 0.10 0.63 
Household size -0.10 0.10 0.07 
* District fixed effect variables are used in the estimation of the logit models and the specific 
results for these variables are not reported in the Table in the interest of space. There are 166 
districts included in the data from Armenia. 
 
Table 4.3: Association of Farm Productivity and Sales using Generalized Nonparametric 
Regression  
 Catch-up ratio Frontier shift ratio Malmquist index 
ratio 
Constant  0.76*** 1.28*** 1.00 *** 
Probability of sales 0.13*** -0.08*** 0.03*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4.4: DEA Farm Productivity of Farm Households in Armenia 







Catch-up 1.76 1.30 -0.45 
Frontier shift 0.67 1.50 0.83 
Malmquist Index 1.35 1.71 0.57 
 
Table 4.5: Association of Whitened Productivity and Sales using Nonparametric DEA 
Estimation 
 Catch-up  Frontier shift  Malmquist index  
Constant  0.05 -0.08*** 0.03 
Probability of sales -0.03 0.02 -0.08 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.6: Impact of Training on Unconditional DEA Farm Productivity using OLS 
 catch-up Frontier Malmquist index 












    
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.7: Impact of Training (ITT) on Conditional DEA Farm Productivity using OLS 
 catch-up Frontier Malmquist index 












R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4.8: Effect of Treatment Assignment on Training Completion using Probit Model 
(1st stage) 
 Training completion 
Constant  -1.68*** 
Intention to treat 1.53*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 4.9: Impact of Training (LATE) on Unconditional DEA Farm Productivity using 
2SLS  
 catch-up Frontier Malmquist index 
















































R2 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 4.10: Impact of Training (LATE) on Conditional DEA Farm Productivity using 
2SLS  
 catch-up Frontier Malmquist index 
















































R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Figure 4.2: Plotting Catchup using Local Polynomial Smoothing  
 
Figure 4.3: Plotting Frontier Shift using Local Polynomial Smoothing  
 
 




Chapter 5. Overall Conclusion 
Examining whether or not farm education and extension program increases farm efficiency and/or 
innovation is important. Due to an increasingly limited availability of land, and continuous 
increases of world population, increasing agricultural production through increases in efficiency 
and/or innovation is crucial to alleviate future food security issues. Traditionally, the effect of 
extension program is evaluated using yield and farm profit, but farm efficiency could also be used 
as an outcome variable to evaluate the impact such programs.  
Using a simple model, we show how farm efficiency could be used as complementary outcome 
variable to evaluate extension programs. Extension programs are thought to increase income 
through increases in farm efficiency. An extension program that shows no or little impact on profit 
may still have resulted in more efficient production behavior for farmers, such as subsistence 
farmers, that are beset by credit constraints. We note that when farmers are capital constrained, 
extension programs can theoretically have a large efficiency effect despite a small or no change in 
farm profits.  
Assessing the program with alternative methods improves the ability to accurately and credibly 
evaluate the impact and results in a more efficient allocation of limited funds and resources. If the 
full impact of a development program is not adequately captured and some key benefits go 
undetected, the case for allocating funds for such programs may weaken unnecessarily. With 
increasing demand and declining supply of development funds, the need for innovative and more 
rigorous impact evaluation methods is becoming more critical for international development 
community in general and for extension and technology transfer programs in particular.  
However, if we are touse farm technical efficiency as outcome variable, then correct way of 
estimating the metric is crucial. Mismeasurement may counteract the advantages to incorporating 
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efficiency analysis if the analysis is done incorrectly. We demonstrate the measurement of farm 
efficiency for transaction costs and other factors heterogeneous farmers face in developing 
countries.  
The standard approach to measure productivity analysis such as efficiency assumes that farm 
households face homogenous prices that leads to homogenous sets of production and profit 
functions.  Transaction costs and crop qualities attributes create a price wedge between the market 
and shadow price of crops.  Transaction costs and other factors are heterogeneous and leads to 
heterogeneous price wedges among farmers such as subsistence, semi-subsistence and commercial 
farmers. Subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers who produce largely home consumed crops 
have potentially higher price wedges than commercial farmers. Failing to account for the 
heterogeneous set of price wedges that lead to varying profit and production frontiers is likely to 
lead to underestimation of the efficiency of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers.  
In this paper, we explicitly model the potential impact of price wedges on optimal crop choices for 
profit maximizing farm household. We show that the existence of price wedges discourages 
production of cash crops and encourages production of home consumed crops. With the increase 
of price wedges, a profit maximizing farm household, more typically subsistence farmers, 
withdraws inputs from cash crops and allocates them toward home consumed crop production. 
Because of significant price wedges, use of modern technologies, and production of high values 
crops are unprofitable to subsistence and some of the semi-subsistence farmers. As a result, 
farmers use the traditional inputs and produce dominantly seemingly low value crops. On the other 
hand, commercial farmers use modern technologies and produce high value crops as it is still 




We test whether or not traditional productivity analysis indeed underestimates the efficiency of 
subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers by employing a conditional Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model for household survey data in Uganda. Results confirm that naïve estimates of 
efficiency understate the efficiency scores of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers.  The 
results cast doubt on policies, such as extension programs or other information treatments, based 
on interpreting low efficiency scores for subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as a 
management shortfall. 
We examine the efficiency impacts of an extension program within the context of a cluster 
randomized control trial in Armenia. Fortson et al. (2012) and Schwab and Shanoyan (2016) 
examined this treatment effect on farm profit and find ambiguous results. We investigate the effect 
of treatment on catch-up efficiency, frontier shift and Malmquist index using conditional DEA.  
Controlling for other variables (e.g. non-farm income, education, etc.), the training program has 
statistically significant and positive impacts on catch-up. However, our results indicate treatment 
effect show no significant effect on innovation and Malmquist index. Overall, the demonstration 
suggests that increasing methods to evaluate extension program helps to identify the impacts that 
would have gone undetected.  
 
 
 
